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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs-
KENNETH LEE STANDROD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 13959 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was the consolidated trial of two Informations 
filed in Kane County, Utah, each of which charged appellant with 
the crime of first degree murder in violation of Sec. 76-5-202, 
Utah Code Annot.(19 53) , alleging that he intentionally and know-
ingly caused the death of Thomas Earl Morris and Teresa Clair 
Beaty and at the time of each of said killings committed another 
homicide. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a jury trial of some twelve days in the District 
Court of Kane County, defendant, on March 8, 19 74, was found 
guilty of murder in the first degree in both cases. On March 
8th, 1974, following a penalty hearing before the Court, a jury 
having been waived, appellant was sentenced to the Utah State 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Prison for life and commitment issued forthwith. (R.73).* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his convictions and an Order 
remanding the cases for new trial or, in the alternative, an Order 
remanding the cases to the District Court of the Sixth Judicial 
District, Kane County, State of Utah, on a charge of manslaughter 
and requiring that Court to sentence appellant for that offense. 
' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At some time in the middle of the day on October 20, 
1973, two persons were killed at a cabin owned by appellant at 
Navajo Lake Estates in Kane County. There is little conflict 
in the evidence adduced at trial (from the other persons present, 
i.e., appellant, Candice Earle, Layton Roselund, Paul Kunzel, 
and Richard Higgins) concerning the events which occurred on the 
day prior to and the morning of the deaths. Thus, no inappropriate 
liberty will be taken by omitting extensive references to the tran-
script in describing those events. Appellant had become engaged 
to marry Candice Earle and had determined to build a home at Navajo 
Lake Estates. In September Standrod had met Layton Roselund and 
Paul Kunzel and had made an agreement with them to the effect that 
he would basically support them in exchange for their labor in 
helping him build the cabin. Subsequently, on approximately Sept-
ember 20th, Standrod met Richard Higgins in Las Vegas and made 
a similar agreement with him. Thus, during late September and 
October, Higgins, Kunzel, Roselund, Earle and Standrod were together 
at the cabin site. One or two other individuals were also there 
on varying occasions. According to Earle, Standrod and Roselund 
had gone to Las Vegas to finish moving their belongings and to 
*"
,fRn designations will hereinafter refer to the Record on Appeal. 
"T" designations will hereinafter refer to the Reporters Transcript. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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acquire supplies for the cabin for the winter, and on October 19, 
19 74 they began the return trip in a rented U-Haul truck. Just 
outside of Las Vegas they saw two hitchhikers and Mr. Roselund 
suggested that they pick them up. After some discussion during 
which the hitchhikers introduced themselves as Lonely Cloud (Tom 
Morris) and Teresa, it was agreed the hitchhikers would ride in 
the back of the truck. Standrod was solicitous of the hitchhikers 
during the trip, purchasing food, vodka (for them to celebrate 
their engagement), and other creature comforts. They arrived at 
the cabin, where Kunzel and Higgins were already present, just 
before midnight. After introductions had been made and a short 
period of conversation, everyone decided to go to bed. Teresa 
and Tom were apparently to sleep in the living room of the cabin 
on a foam mattress. Just prior to retiring Teresa said something 
to the effect of "Who's coming to bed with men and Tom responded, 
"It had better not be anyone but me" (T.711, 1132). It would 
appear that Rick Higgins and Paul Kunzel slept in the kitchen area 
of the cabin adjacent to Tom and Teresa (T.1132). 
Upon rising at dawn the next morning some breakfast was 
eaten and at about that time Standrod placed on the kitchen table 
of the cabin a quantity of a drug which everyone thought was T.H.C. 
(Tetra-Hydro-Canabanol) and he, Layton Roselund, and Candice Earle, 
all ingested some by "snorting" (T.1138). At about this time Kunzel 
and Higgins "snorted" some cocaine,(T.1011). Thus, apart from 
the victims, everyone at the cabin site was, during the 20th of 
October, under the influence of mind altering drugs. 
On the way to the cabin the night before there had been 
conversation about the fact that deer season was opening the next 
morning. Standrod had seen a dead deer in the roadway and wanted 
" -3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to post "No Hunting" signs at the spring near his cabin to alert 
hunters that it was a residental area and firing of weapons could 
be dangerous. Hence that morning Standrod, Roselund, and Morris 
decided to go to the spring and do what they could to secure the 
safety of the premises. • 
As Morris and Standrod proceeded towards the spring 
(which was some 400 yards from the house) Roselund went off some-
where on his own and was separated from them for approximately 
one-half hour to forty-five minutes (T.940). 
Higgins stated that while the others had gone to the 
spring, he went into a room under the front porch of the cabin 
to work on a window (T.672). Kunzel indicated that he was working 
on a porch at the back of the cabin (T.840). Roselund met Stand-
rod, and Tom on the way back from the spring, and they all returned 
to the house at approximately 11:00 or 11:15 (T.942). All three 
individuals were armed when they left for the spring and were 
still armed on their return to the house, Tom with a ,357 Magnum 
which he was wearing on his hip (T.1024); Roselund with a 30-30 
rifle, which he placed by the door to the deck (T.1023); and 
Standrod with a M-l Carbine. 
Upon the return from the spring, Roselund indicated 
that he went to work carrying items out of the downstairs room 
to the truck (T.946). He indicated that during this time he 
was not aware of Higgins working in the downstairs room (T.1032). 
Apparently, upon the return, Standrod met Candice on the front 
porch of the cabin which was immediately outside the living room 
(T.1036), and remained there until the killings occurred (T.1145-
1151). 
In summary, and to place the individuals at this time, 
•
:
 - 4 -
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Pvoselund was apparently on his way from the cabin to the truck, 
Candice Earle and Standrod were on the front porch, Paul Kunzel 
was supposedly working on the back porch, Teresa was lying in 
the living room (and while no one recalls specifically, everyone 
assumed that Morris was with her), and Higgins claims that he 
was on route from the downstairs room for the purpose of obtaining 
a tape measure, (T.672). At this point it is appropriate to analyze 
the stories on an individual basis. 
Rick Higgins testified that at approximately 1:30 p.m. 
he went from the downstairs up into the cabin to find a tape measure 
(T.672). He didn't see Earle or appellant on the front porch 
(T.730), nor appellant in the cabin as he went inside (T.672), 
but was aware that Teresa and Morris were lying down (T.731). 
He proceeded midway into the cabin and was facing north looking 
for a tape measure when he heard shots (T.731). He turned around, 
heard a few more shots and saw flames coming from a weapon (T.673). 
It was appellant that he !Tappeared to see at the time" (T.732), 
holding the weapon in front of the — parallel with the bodies, 
facing towards the bodies" (T.673), both of whom were lying on 
the foam rubber mattress in the living room. Higgins said that 
Standrod i\ras standing at a position from which Morris was slightly 
to his right and Beaty was slightly to his left, and the victims 
were prostrate facing each other (T.673). Higgins said that he 
"couldn't be dead positive" that Standrod was doing the firing 
(T.799), his reservation growing out of the fact that he was "high" 
and "under the influence of drugs" (T.813). The rounds were fired 
at a distance of two feet from the feet of the victims (T.811) 
and he he was not sure what kind of weapon it was. He was aware 
that there was a hole in the girl's right temple and also observed 
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numerous wounds in the mid-section of the boy CT.674-5), Immedi-
ately after the shooting Higgins, Standrod and Earle went out on 
the front porch (T.675) and Higgins stated that he then went under 
the cabin and had a conversation with Roselund (T.675). Thereafter, 
he talked to Paul Kunzel, and went with him to the trailer for 
a period of approximately one-half hour before he returned to the 
cabin (T.676). The first time he saw Kunzel after the shooting 
was ffright when I stepped out on the porch; he was coming from 
the west side of the cabin,T (T.788). 
Paul Kunzel testified that he was working on the back 
porch on the north end of the cabin. He said he heard shots and 
surmised it was someone target practicing off the front porch 
(T.845). When he heard the shots he was reminded that he had 
left a shotgun leaning against a tree in the back of the cabin. 
He didn't think there was any need for the shotgun being outside, 
so he recovered the shotgun and entered the cabin through the north 
door. As he entered, he saw Standrod standing near the south door 
of the cabin with a Mstrangen look on his face (T.845). Kunzel 
continued toward the south end of the cabin "where I was going to 
place the gun and as I was placing the gun down,lf heard Standrod 
say something to the effect of, "So what, you've got a little blood 
on youn. At that point he noticed Standrod lfgazing in the direction 
of the bodies and Candice standing behind him with a very astonished 
look on her face" (T.846). Kunzel noticed the wounds, realized 
what had happened and walked out the south door of the cabin about 
thirty feet away. Kunzel saw Standrod ten feet from the victims' 
feet (T.847), didn't notice him holding a weapon (T.847), and was 
not aware of any peculiar smell in the room (T.909). It was no 
more than one minute from the time Kunzel heard the shots until 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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he got inside the cabin (T.904). Upon exiting the south door he 
observed Roselund coming up from the lower area with Higgins behind 
him (T.849). 
Layton Roselund was engaged in carrying materials from 
the room under the front porch of the cabin to a truck at the time 
the killings occurred. During the course of a return trip to the 
cabin he heard some shots [T.946). Rick came out of the passageway 
near the lower room of the cabin or around the lower end of the 
cabin and told Roselund he should Mgo up there", and may have indicated 
that someone had been shot (T.946-947). As he approached the porch 
of the cabin he saw Standrod and Earle sitting on the deck (T.947). 
He didn't notice anything in either of their hands (T.1036). He 
testified that he looked in the door, came out, and for a reason 
he couldn't pinpoint, asked Standrod why "he shot the people" (T.947). 
Standrod apparently did not seem aware of what had happened and 
kept saying that they were alright, and asked someone to go wake 
them up (T.1043-44). Layton indicated that they stayed on the porch 
for 15 to 30 minutes, during which time Rick approached. He was 
not aware of having seen Kunzel on the porch (T.1045). 
Candice Earle testified that immediately prior to the 
killing she and Standrod were sitting on the porch or the deck 
of the cabin in some state of euphoric bliss about the completion 
of their cabin and their mutual love for each other (T.1150,1225). 
With the esception of Beaty and Morris, she didn't know where the 
others at the cabin were (T.1148). Sometime after getting coffee 
for Standrod she walked over to the door of the cabin to ask Tom 
and Teresa to come out and discovered they were dead. Standrod 
\\ras still out on the porch (T.1151). He had come up behind her 
and she remembers him shaking the victim's feet and saying, "Wake 
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up", and then addressing a rhetorical question: "Why is that blood 
on them;" or "Why is that blood on you?".(T.1153). Candice then 
stated that they went back out on the porch, sat down and then went 
back in to double check "because we thought we had imagined the 
whole thing" (T.1153), She then went back out and saw Roselund 
walking toward the cabin and told him to come up quick (T.1154). 
At that point in her testimony the State brought up a prior statement 
made by Candice at preliminary hearing that Kenneth had, during 
the period immediately before the killings, gone into the cabin 
(T.1157), and that she had said: "Ken, why did you kill those people?" 
.(T.1166). However, she further testified that when Layton Roselund 
approached he came directly to Standrod and repeatedly said "Why 
did you blow those two people away?" (T.1230), and that he [Roselund] 
would have to take Standrod "to a fix-it shop and have himself (sic) 
fixed,.. ."(T.1171). Roselund picked up a rifle which Ken had 
been cleaning and accosted Ken with it (T.1172). It was at this 
point, after Roselund had accused Standrod of the killings (T.1238), 
that Candice made her statement (T.1173). Layton then commenced 
a series of statements related to the fact that Kenneth had been 
apparently possessed by some sort of a devil (T.1174) and that it 
was GodTs will that "it was done that way",(T.1178). At this point 
Kenneth Standrod denied having killed either of the victims (T.1178). 
Throughout this sequence of events Earle did not see either Rick 
Higgins or Paul Kunzel enter or leave the cabin (T.1228). Subsequently 
during a conversation in the vicinity of the north porch, Higgins 
and Kunzel joined Roselund, Earle and Standrod (T.1181). Ken asked 
whether anyone had seen what happened. Kunzel just said, "I am 
shocked." Higgins said "I donft know, I was too messed up. I am 
not sure. I think I saw it. I saw it and didn't see it." 
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The effect of the shots was described by Josiah Taylor, 
M.D., then the State Medical Examiner. Beaty had a wound entering 
her right forehead near the eye and exiting the head at the midline 
in the rear; and a second wound entering her right deltoid region, 
exiting high on the right shoulder, reentering and fracturing the 
right jaw, the slug ultimately embedding itself in the seventh 
cervical vertibrae. The slug causing the headwound had no particular 
deviation upward or downward, but did deviate sideways at a seventy 
degree angle (T.620). Defects in a parka recovered from the grave 
indicated that she was wearing at least the right sleeve of that 
parka when she was shot (T.658). Morris had a wound in the left 
chest; the slug penetrated the heart, right lung, and impacted in 
the right shoulder from where it was recovered intact. He had a 
second would high in the left arm penetrating soft tissue, and a 
third wound in the left arm toward the back which fractured the 
bone; fragments of the latter slug were recovered (T.624, £t seq.) . 
Taylor indicated that there were at least four but probably five 
bullets involved in the deaths. 
There is, again, a general consistency regarding material 
events occurring subsequent to the time when everyone was reunited 
at the conversation which occurred in the vicinity of the north 
porch shortly after the shooting. Layton Roselund decided the bodies 
should be buried, and commenced to dig a grave. Roselund and Higgins 
carried the bodies to the grave. Roselund, on his own initiative, 
decided a burial ceremony would be appropriate, sprinkled wheat 
and water over the bodies, and recited some sort of prayer (T.1079-80). 
Appellant was not significantly involved in preparation of the grave 
nor the burial ceremony. 
Roselund had insisted that he would not stay on the prem-
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ises unless the weapons were ?fgotten rid of"(T.1050), and assumed 
an attitude of control of the situation due to his "spiritual aware-
ness" (T. 1051-52) . Standrod "didn't see any reason why the guns 
should be gotten rid of"(T.1050); however, Candice Earle was par-
ticularly concerned that Roselund remain (T.1052), and Standrod 
therefore consented that the guns could be removed from the prem-
ises (T.1052). Roselund suggested that Higgins and Kunzel leave 
the cabin (T.1081), and the guns were gathered up (T.1083). Higgins 
and Kunzel left in the U-Haul truck and stopped at Cedar City. 
Kunzel headed home to Bremerton, Washington on a motorcycle given 
him by Standrod and Higgins continued on to Las Vegas. 
There is no doubt that the .357 magnum pistol was in 
the U-Haul, because it was impounded by the Las Vegas Police when 
Higgins contacted them on the 21st after having discussed the event 
with two other persons and dropping off his own weapons. Kunzel 
said that Higgins and Roselund gathered the weapons (T.907); Rose-
lund said he told Higgins to gather the guns, but didn?t see who 
did it (T.1083); Higgins said that he, Kunzel and Roselund gathered 
the weapons. However, none of the three recalled having loaded 
the ,357 pistol (T.751, 907, 1084), and only Higgins claimed to 
have specifically seen it in the truck. Roselund couldn't recall 
it at all (T.1083); Kunzel's testimony was to the effect that he 
made a point to be sure all the guns were in the truck, and that 
while he couldn't say if he "even did see it," he satisfied his 
"curiosity if all the guns were accounted for"(T.906). No one 
claimed that Standrod gathered, nor placed any weapons on the truck. 
It is at least interesting to note that the shotgun which Kunzel 
used as an excuse for going inside the cabin after hearing shots 
had somehov/ gotten back outside right where it was when Kunzel picked 
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it up, Higgins remembered that a .308 and a .30-.30 were being 
gathered and the shotgun was on the north porch. When asked speci-
fically about its position he testified, "Well, I don't remember. 
I remember it was back there, against a tree, I believe"(T.750~751) . 
Subsequently, Kane County Sheriff's officers and Highway 
Patrolmen arrived at the cabin and arrested Standrod, Earle and 
Roselund on charges of murder in the first degree. Subsequently, 
Earle and Roselund were granted immunity by the State. 
All that is left, then, is to relate the testimony of 
Kenneth Standrod, adduced in his own defense. The defendant's 
testimony concerning the events of the evening and morning prior 
to the killings is fundamentally consistent with that of all the 
other witnesses. Upon returning to the cabin after the trip to 
the spring, Standrod sat down on the deck in front of the cabin 
with Candice, and Layton and Lonely Cloud went inside (T.1513). 
After some conversation with Candice regarding the cabin being 
finished, the final move from Las Vegas, and et. cetera, Candice 
went inside to fix some coffee (T.1514). Standrod went to the 
front door, watched her making the coffee, and was aware of a person 
inside the cabin to his left. As Candice was coming toward the v 
front door he stepped inside to let her pass, picked up a 30-30 
which was laying by the door, and went back outside and sat down 
again (T.1515). After some brief conversation he heard "hammer 
noises" which prompted him to ask Candice where everyone was (T.1517). 
Candice said she didn't know, and they both approached the front 
door. Standrod stepped inside the door and saw Tom and Teresa lying 
on the foam rubber mattress with blood on them. He stepped back, 
took Candy's hand, went into the cabin, and asked them to wake up 
(T.1517-18). At that time he was not aware of anyone present in 
_ 11 _ 
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the cabin (T.1518). Standrod sat down on the porch and Candice 
yelled to Roselund. Roselund came up on the porch, picked up a 
rifle and while shaking it at Standrod asked him why he had killed 
"these peoplen(T.1519). Standrod denied it, and manifested con-
fusion at the question (T.1519). At this point, Rick Higgins came 
onto the porch. A discussion occurred, during which Roselund "arrested1 
Standrod (T.1920), The conversation drifted through the cabin and 
onto the back porch. Standrod was continually asking the individuals 
in the conversation what had happened and what each of them had 
seen (T.1521). While at the back end of the cabin Roselund demanded 
that the guns be removed as a pre-condition for him to remain at 
the cabin site (T.1522). After a conversation between Roselund 
and Higgins (T.1525), Roselund walked by with a pick and shovel 
and stated, "This is on your shoulders, too, Ken"(T.1526). Roselund 
then walked up the hill and apparently, during the next three or 
four hours, it was decided by everybody involved that Standrod was 
guilty of the offense (T.152S); even Candice Earle (now Standrod) 
apparently commenced to take Roselund's side on the matter, (T.1534) • 
Roselund, during this entire period of time, more or less took charge 
of things, and organized the parties to do tasks which he designated 
(T.1537). Standrod indicated that he was desirous of reporting 
the matter to the police, but was advised not to do so by Layton 
(T.1538). He indicated that he made a similar suggestion to Candice 
late that evening when they were in bed, but she apparently had 
acceded to the advice of Layton and advised him not to do so (T.1543). 
Fundamentally Layton told him to forget it (T.1545). On cross-
examination Standrod indicated that he did not hear gunshots in 
the cabin (T.1569), but did hear loud hammering. He did not see 
either Higgins nor Kunzel come out of the south door of the cabin 
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(T.1570), and admitted having told Sheriff Deputy Kelley that f,itM 
was an accident (T.1573), He clearly denied having killed either 
of the victims (T.1576), and continues that denial to this date. 
Finally, there is great significance to the uniform 
comments of all the witnesses as to the apparent physical and mental 
state of Standrod at the time of and immediately after the shooting. 
From the mouth of Richard Higgins: 
A. I j u s t remember i t was kind of confus ing , t h a t 
Kenny was s u r e , you know. He - - Kenny d i d n ' t r e a l i z e 
what had happened, you know, he d i d n ' t - -
& & & 
Well, he just wanted to know what happened, you know, 
he just — you know, "Did you see it, did you see 
what I did," or he asked me what happened. (T.678). 
A. Just that Kenny just -~ everytime he saw some-
body, he wanted, you know, their help to know what 
had happened and, you know, like he was in a different 
state of mind than I had seen him before. (T.682). 
A. [Standrod said]: "If I did this thing, kill me." 
(T.749). 
Q. Did he, at anytime before or thereafter, indicate 
to you or anyone else that he had any knowledge of 
the actual shooting of those two people? 
A. No he didn't. .CT.750). 
Higgins replied that he had made the following 
statement to Detective Riley Cannon on October 24th. 
"Kenny was still, you know, Kenny was still shook 
up. He didn't know what he was doing. He really 
didnTt know he had done anything." (T.1445). 
From the mouth of Paul Kunzel: 
A. I walked in and observed Ken standing near the 
south door and he looked up at me and we made eye 
contact but it was a very strange look that I got 
from him. ... I heard Ken say something to the effect 
that "So,"what, youfve got a little blood on you." 
(T.845). 
A. Well, like I say, he was more or less gazing 
in the direction of the bodies. He seemed very 
distant even from the first glance that I got when 
I walked in the north door. (T.848). 
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the grave was completed) he had observed: A. "Yes. 
He was very, very depressed. He was kneeling on 
the ground, cursing the devil, asked me to kill him 
with the pick, he was just in a very broken down 
state of mind." (T.863)m 
A. His attitude was the same, just his broken down 
mental state, very broken down, near crying. (T.865). 
From the mouth of Layton Roselund: 
Right after the shooting: A. I can only remember 
[he said] something like,"They are alright," or "They 
can get up," or "They will wake up," or something 
to that effect, but nothing that to me seemed coherent. 
(T.947). 
* * * 
Well, he looked in kind of a strange state of con-
sciousness. I mean just both of them had kind of 
a shocked look and Ken had kind of a docile, starry 
kind of look, you know. (T.949). 
A. Ken seemed to be kind of indifferent. He was 
just not really, like he just wasn't aware of the 
situation, you know, and Candy was the one who was 
really most concerned and then later -- (T.953). 
A. [In relation to the occurrence on the porch] 
A, Yes, he seemed to be incoherent to me. 
Q. What makes you think he was incoherent? What 
happened? What did he say? 
A. He seemed to be unaware of -~ he even seemed 
to be unaware of what had happened. Just, he made 
remarks about something about, "TheyTre alright, 
or "They w i l l get u p . " (T .1044) . 
A. [At t h e g r a v e s i t e ] . . . He s a i d a number of 
t h i n g s : "Did I do t h i s , " or "Why did I do it , r 'T o r , 
"Did I do i t . " . . . I w a s n ' t paying t h a t much 
a t t e n t i o n . I was more in a s t u p o r . . . . (T .1055) . 
From the mouth of Candice E a r l e : 
A. I remember Kenny shaking h i s foot and s a y i n g , 
"Wake u p , " and then he s a i d , "Why i s t h a t b lood 
on them," o r , "Why i s t h a t blood on y o u , " and then 
we went back out and s a t down and then we went back 
in again to double check because we thought maybe 
we had imagined the whole t h i n g (T .1153) . 
A. [Upon being accussed of the murders by Layton, 
Ken s a i d ] I d i d n ' t k i l l anybody. (T .1178) . 
A. [S t and rod ' s comments dur ing the b u r i a l ] God, 
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if I did this, please, forgive me. (T.1187). And 
to each individual at the grave: "If you saw me 
do this, please shoot me.n (T.1245). 
A. [At the cabin after the burial, Ken said] What 
happened? Can anybody tell me what happened? Did 
you see anything? (T.1189). 
And from the mouth of Kenneth Standrod: 
A. To me, at that moment [the burial] I was naturally 
very confused. It was just like a nightmare to me. 
These people standing around accusing me and nobody 
is telling me anything. And I don't know nothing. 
(T.1S27). 
A. ... I had started crying then and I had kept 
turning to them and asking them, "Well, do you know 
that I did this," and at this time Candy and Paul 
was there, Rick is there and Layton and I am down 
the hill a little way from where they are digging 
the grave and so on and I am crying and I have turned 
to them again and asked them. At this time things 
seem to be a little different though, like everyone 
is standing around looking at me like that they're 
definately convinced of it at the time. 
Q. Convinced of what? 
A. That I had shot these people, they had been 
discussing it. (T.1528). 
A. Well, I was crying and I stood up and looked 
at each one of them individually because I was trying 
to get a little more control of myself because I 
could believe it but then I couldn't believe it, 
because no one was giving me an explanation. They 
were saying, "Yes," but yet no one knew anything. 
A. I turned to each one of them and I asked them, 
and I, you know, done this thing and each one gave 
the statement before, "Yeah," you know, now they 
are giving the statement that I did and then I turned 
to them and said, "Well, if I did this thing, why 
don't you kill me J1 (T.1259). 
The penalty hearing produced no new evidence but only argu-
ments for and against leniency. 
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POINT I. THE CHARGES AS SET FORTH IN INFORMATIONS 10 5 AND 106 
TOGETHER WITH THE CONSOLIDATED TRIAL OF SAID CAUSES 
SUBJECTED PETITIONER TO BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY FOR 
THE SAME OFFENSE. 
A. Petitioner was charged in Information 105 of the 
murder in the first degree by the following language: 
... On or about the 20th day of October, 1973 at 
Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, State of Utah, 
the defendant KENNETH LEE STANDROD, did intentionally 
and knowingly cause the death of Kenneth Earl Morris 
and at the same time and place did commit another 
homicide. 
In Information 106, petitioner was charged with murder in the first 
degree by this language: 
... On or about the 20th day of October, 1973 at 
Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, State of Utah, 
the defendant, KENNETH LEE STANDROD, did intentionally 
and knowingly cause the death of Teresa Clair Beatty, 
and at the same time and place did commit another 
homicide. 
The statutory provision alleged to have been violated in the foregoing 
matters was Sec. 76-5-202, Utah Code Annot.,1953 as amended, which reads 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
first degree if under circumstances not constituting 
manslaughter, the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another under any of the follow-
ing circumstances: 
... (b) At the time the homicide was committed 
the actor also committed another homicide. 
Under the statutory scheme found in Title 76, Chapter 5, Utah Code 
Annot.,1953, as amended, the traditional "premeditation" element 
of first degree murder has been abandoned in favor of a legislative 
finding that "circumstances" rather than "intent" should constitute 
the aggrevating factors justifying the punishment attendant to 
conviction of murder in the first degree as opposed to murder in 
the second degree. Under Chapter 5 of Title 76, any criminal 
homicide not defined as manslaughter, negligent homicide or automobile 
homicide is "murder," the only scienter requirement set forth either 
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for first degree or second degree murder being "knowing11 or "inten-
tional". 
Under both informations the jury was required, in order 
to convict petitioner of first degree murder, to find the following: 
1. That petitioner committed criminal homicides 
under circumstances not constituting manslaughter; 
2. That the said homicides were knowing or inten-
tional and; 
3. That at the same time the charged homicide 
was committed petitioner also committed another homi-
cide. 
Only two persons were victims of criminal homicides. Therefore 
it is obvious, inasmuch as the Informations required that the jury 
not only find that appellant killed the named victim in each Infor-
mation but also killed, at the same time, another individual, that 
in the Information charging petitioner with the death of Thomas 
Earl Morris the "other homicide" victim had to be Teresa Clair Beaty; 
and, the "other homicide" in the murder of Beaty must have been Morris. 
Inasmuch as the Informations do not charge any circumstance 
which would constitute murder in the first degree besides multiple 
homicides, it is clear that had appellant been charged with killing 
only one victim the maximum offense of which he could have been 
convicted is murder in the second degree. Under the statute, in 
order to find petitioner guilty of first degree murder in the death 
of Morris, the jury was required, as an element of the offense, 
to find that at the same time petitioner also killed Beaty, and 
vice versa. Had the jury not found two separate homicides in each 
case, petitioner could not have been found guilty of murder in the 
first degree. Since the second homicide in each case is an element 
of the offense for which additional penalty is exacted, petitioner 
was clearly placed "twice in jeopardy" for each of the homicides. 
B. The language of the double jeopardy clause in the Con-
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stitution of Utah (Article I, Sec.12) is identical to that contained 
in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
There is therefore no distinction between the meaning of the state 
double jeopardy provision and that contained in the federal Constitu-
tion. In any event the federal jeopardy provision is applicable 
against the states by reason of the Fourteen Amendment. Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 89 S.Ct. 2056. Therefore 
the federal standard is applicable to determination of whether 
appellant has been denied his right to be free from double jeopardy. 
C. There is a significant body of case law defining 
the scope and meaning of the double jeopardy clause related to 
meaning of the word "offense11 as it is used therein. 
The controlling double jeopardy case as of this date is 
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 90 S.Ct.1189 (1970) 
in which the defendant, with others, was charged with armed robbery 
of a poker game in which there were six players. The defendants 
were charged with seven separate offenses which included counts of 
robbing each of the six victims. At trial, four of the victims 
were called to testify. Testimony indentifying defendant as one 
of the robbers was weak, and the jury found him Mnot guilty due 
to insufficient evidence". Later the defendant was tried for the 
robbery of one of the other victims and was convicted upon substan-
tially stronger testimony from essentially the same witnesses on 
the question of his identity. In sustaining defendant's conviction 
in habeas corpus proceedings the District Court felt itself bound 
by the decision in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, which involved 
a multiple robbery in a tavern and in which the Supreme Court upheld 
petitioner's conviction, viewing the question presented solely on 
due process grounds and concluding that the course the state had 
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pursued had not led to "fundamental unfairness." 
In Ashe, the Supreme Court held that Benton v. Maryland, 
supra, required the Court to ansv/er not the question whether collat-
eral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is 
an essential part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double 
jeopardy. The Court did "not hesitate" to hold that it is; supra, 
at 397 U.S. 445, and that the question of its applicability in a 
particular case was no longer a matter to be left for state deter-
mination but a matter of constitutional fact to be decided upon 
the entire record. Concluding that since the first jury could not, 
on the record, have concluded that there was no robbery, the ^ ourt 
stated that 
[ojnce a jury had determined upon conflicting evidence 
that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the -
petitioner was one of the robbers, the state could 
not present the same or different identification 
evidence in a second prosecution for the robbery. ..; 
supra at 446. 
The Court apparently found that the term "robbery" as defined 
by the code of the charging state, was a synonym for the term "of-
fense" as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment, and held that 
once having been acquitted of the acts constituting that offense, 
appellant could not be retried for them. Justices Brennen, Douglas 
and Marshall, concurring, adopted the "same transaction" test for 
double jeopardy purposes, indicating that defendant could only 
be tried once for events occurring during the'same criminal trans-
action. Justice Brennan specifically adopted the view that one 
can be tried only once for all criminal offenses embodied in a 
single criminal episode. This view is the rule in Utah under Sec. 
76-1-403, Utah Code (1975 Pocket Supp.). 
Ashe, supra, overruled a significant body of case 
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387, and People v. Logomarsino, 217 P.2d 124, 97 C.A.2d 92. The 
Ashe rule has been adopted by the courts of most of the western 
states. State v. Quintana, 364 P.2d 120, 69 N.M. 51 is typical: 
If several criminal offenses are the same, as where 
they arise out of the same transaction, were committed 
at the same time, and were part of a continuous act 
and inspired by the same criminal intent, which is 
an essential element of each offense, they are sus-
ceptible of only one punishment. 
See also, Application of Williams, 333 P.2d 280, 85 Ariz. 109, and 
People v. Brown, 320 P.2d 5, 49 C.2d 577, In the latter case defendant 
tfas charged with and convicted of both murder and abortion, and 
the California Supreme Court struck the conviction for abortion 
on the theory that the criminal intent requisite for both offenses 
was merged into one cause of action which barred trial for both 
offenses. Other cases embodying the general reasoning of this 
holding are People v. Belcher, 15 Cr.L. 264 (Cal.S.Ct. 3/28/74), 
State v. Gregory, 16 Cr.L. 2539 (N.J.S.Ct. 2/26/75), State v. 
Maestes, N.M.S.Ct. (9/18/74). 
There is significant authority for the proposition that 
where a defendant is charged with one crime on two theories and 
a general verdict is returned finding defendant either guilty or 
not guilty without a statement as to which theory the jury considered 
in arriving at its verdict, retrial under either theory is barred 
by the double jeopardy clause. See Musser v. Utah, 330 U.S. 95, 
90 L.Ed. 562, 68 S.Ct. 397. See also, Yeates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 
298, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356, 77 S.Ct. 1064; Street v. New York, 395 U.S. 
516, 22 L.Ed.2d 572, 89 S.Ct.. 13; Leary v. U.S. , 395 U.S. 6, 23 
L.Ed.2d 57, 89 S.Ct. 1532. Thus, logically, if there is ambiguity 
as to which of the theories formed the basis for the verdict on 
the first trial, retrial must be barred because of the possibility 
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be duplicated in the second in violation of double jeopardy prohibitions. 
In the instant case it is clear that the killing of Beaty 
was found by the jury as an element of the first degree charge of 
killing Morris, and vice versa. Musser, supra, and the other cases 
cited, are therefore authority for the proposition that once a 
verdict has been rendered on a charge in which the second homicide 
was found as an element, no further proceeding can be had charging 
a criminal offense based on that same act. 
The Utah rule on double jeopardy has not been subject to 
construction dispositive of the issue raised herein. The courtfs 
language in State v. Thatcher, 157 P.2d 258 108 Utah 63, however, in-
dicates that the Utah Court is of the same view as most of the courts 
cited above. 
Under the doctrine of former jeopardy, if the two 
actions were for the same offense, the former was 
a complete bar to the latter. But if they were 
not for the same offense, the former was no bar 
to any element of the latter, even though such 
element was common to both actions. 
... , where the prosecution is barred under the 
doctrine of former jeopardy, the entire action is 
barred and not merely the use of certain elements 
thereof. 
In this case, the statutory scheme under which appellant was 
tried permits the charging of murder in the second degree for a 
knowing or intentional killing, and that offense becomes murder 
in the first degree only where a multiple homicide is proved. Appel-
lant has been placed in jeopardy for two killings on a single charge 
of murder in the first degree, because the second killing is a nec-
essary element of murder in the first degree. In this case, appel-
lant was charged with the murder of Thomas Earl Morris. That act 
would support a conviction for first degree murder only if the jury 
also found that he killed Teresa Clair Beaty. In the case charging Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the murder of Beaty, that killing would not be murder in the first 
degree, but murder in the second degree, unless the jury also found 
that at the same time appellant killed Morris. Conviction of first 
degree murder carries a substantially greater penalty than second 
degree murder. Therefore, under the cases heretofore cited, the 
most the state could charge was either one first degree murder which 
would require a finding of both killings, or in the alternative, 
two charges of second degree murder or manslaughter. 
An elementary analysis perhaps serves a purpose. If 
it takes two killings to constitute one murder in the first degree 
under the section charged, then it must obviously take four to 
constitute two murders in the first degree. In this case we have 
only two homicides; therefore, one first degree murder is all appel-
lant can be convicted of without placing him twice in jeopardy for 
each of the killings. 
There are several reasons why appellant has been materially 
prejudiced by this constitutional violation. 
First, mere characterization of the second homicide as 
another nfirst degree murder" has an inherent capacity to prejudice. 
Once the knowing and intentional killing of the victim named in 
the first first degree homicide charge is proved, all the state 
must do to secure a conviction for first degree murder is prove 
another ffhomicide.M Since that homicide is not, under the statute, 
required to be any particular one of the five different kinds of 
criminal homicide proscribed by Chapter 5 of title 76, prejudicial 
characterization of the offense should be barred, it being irrelevant 
to any legitimate issue in the case. Further, there is authority 
for the proposition that that the state would not be permitted to 
go into the details of that second homicide if such an exploration Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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would be prejudicial to defendant. See U.S. v. Ostrowsky, 501 
F.2d 318 (7th Cir.1974) in which the government v/as allowed to intro-
duce evidence that the owner of a vehicle had been murdered to prove, 
in defendant's Dyer Act trial, that he knew the car was stolen. 
In reversing the Court said: 
•..the court abused its discretion in permitting 
proof of the gruesome and unnecessary details of 
Croach's murder. By presenting all the gruesome 
evidence ... the judge allowed the government to 
submit evidence to the jury that was at best cumu-
lative. ... moreover, the probable effect of the ruling 
was to divert.the attention of the jury to the murder 
and away [from the crime charged]. 
The second reason applies here. The manner of charging 
permitted introduction of twice as many pictures of dead and maimed 
bodies; twice as many bloody clothes, and all the gruesome details 
of the death of a young couple and the evidence of their relationship 
which would not have been admissible in a single trial. Further, 
had the state been forced to elect which case to proceed with and 
gone on Morris, the jury would have been spared the highly prejudi-
cial evidence of the gruesome death of a young woman. Not knowing 
what the state would have done, the prejudice must be presumed. 
Second, the facts in this case raise another probability 
of prejudice, to-wit: that defendant was deprived of one or more 
affirmative defenses by the manner of charging and joint trial of 
the indictments. There is substantial evidence on the record that 
Morris and Beaty were killed with a .357 magnum pistol. There is 
substantial evidence that the last person seen in possession of 
that weapon was the victim Morris. This fact does raise a possibility 
of a defense of self-defense or justifiable homicide. However, 
when the death of Beaty was charged as an independant first degree 
homicide, the use of that defense is effectively barred because 
no elements of the defense would be useful in defending against 
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the first degree murder charge of Beaty. If, on the other hand, 
the state had elected to proceed only with the trial of first degree 
murder in the case of Morris, with Beaty being the second homicide 
undesignated as to degree, the possibility of a self-defense would 
be substantially greater because it would go to the only charged 
homicide. As to this issue the case of Wikberg v. Henderson, 15 
C.L.2101 (Louisiana S.Ct. 3/25/74) is in point. In that case de-
fendant v/as tried and convicted for felony murder which occurred 
during the course of a robbery. Subsequently, defendant was tried 
for the robbery itself. The court held: 
... to convict the defendants for attempted robbery 
following their conviction for felony murder arising 
out of the same incident violates the prohibition 
against double jeopardy. This holding is required 
because of the nature of the felony murder doctrine. 
... The state is relieved of proving intent to kill 
or inflict great bodily harm. This, in effect, de-
prived the defendant of several defenses which would 
be available in a prosecution for intentional murder. 
For example, a plea of accident, mistake and probably 
even self-defense is unavailing under the felony 
murder doctrine. The only requirements for conviction 
are the commission or attempted commission of the 
enumerated felony and a resulting death ... 
The facts are essentially similar here. As with the Louisiana felony 
murder theory, the Utah multiple homicide provision relieved the 
state from proving any intent beyond that required for second degree 
murder. Once two murders are established, the defendant is presumed 
to be guilty of first degree murder in the absence of affirmative 
evidence that he was not guilty of manslaughter. In this case 
there was a very substantial possibility of a defense of justifiable 
homicide or self defense as to the murder of Thomas Earl Morris, 
which defense was groundless in the case of Beaty. Charging both 
first degree murders with the second homicide being an additional 
necessary element of each, and then trying them together, thereby 
deprived appellant of the possible use of this defense. Thus, he Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has been prejudiced under the holding of Wikberg, supra. 
Third, the Supreme Court has spoken on a similar issue. 
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 26 L.Ed.2d 300, 90 S.Ct. 1757 (1970) 
was a case in which the defendant was charged with murder and found 
guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was sentenced to prison 
for a period of ten to fifteen years, but his conviction was subse-
quently reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court. He was then retried 
for murder and again convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced 
to ten years imprisonment. The defendant argued that the second 
trial placed him twice in jeopardy, inasmuch as he had been impliedly 
acquitted of first degree murder in the first trial. Despite the 
holding of Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184, the Georgia Supreme Court 
rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction. Chief Justice 
Burger, in reversing the conviction,stated at 398 U.S. 326: 
nThe prohibition [against double jeopardy] is not 
against being twice punished, but against being twice 
put in jeopardy ... ." The "twice put in jeopardy" 
language of the Constitution thus relates to a poten-
tional, i.e. , the risk that an accused for a second 
time will be convicted of the same offense for which 
he was initially tried. 
Green v. U.S., supra, held that a second trial for first 
degree murder after a conviction for a lesser and included offense 
was barred because jeopardy for murder ended when a jury could have 
found defendant guilty of the higher charge but didn't, thus, impliedly 
acquitting him of it. After reaffirming Green, the Court, at 398 
U.S. 331, rejected Georgia's contention that the error was harmless 
(because at the second trial defendant received no greater punish-
ment) . 
The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is cast 
in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction^ 
not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict. 
To be charged and to be subjected to a second trial 
for first-degree murder is an ordeal not to be viewed 
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iigntly. Further, and perhaps of more importance, 
we cannot determine whether or not the murder charge 
against petitioner induced The jury^TcTTInd him~^TTiTty 
of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter 
rather than to continue to debate his" innocenceT ~ 






This is the very evil which obtains in the present case. The 
contumely flowing from the very charge of first degree murder is 
significant, particularly when the trial occurs in a small county 
wherein knowledge of the facts is widespread. The fact that the I 
state was permitted to charge a second !,first degree murder" involving 
the same individual whose death was required, under the statute, 
to be found as an element of another first degree murder charge is 
to permit a duplicity which cannot help but have been prejudicial 
to defendant. Under the theory of the Price, supra, case this I 
factor alone requires post-trial relief setting aside the conviction. ^  
I 
Finally, petitioner recommends to the Court the language • 
of Mr. Justice Marshall, then sitting as a Circuit Court Judge, • 
in U.S.ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkens, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.1965), 
cert,denied, 383 U.S. 913. In that case defendant had been charged | 
with first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder. 
His conviction was reversed. He was then retried for murder in J 
the first degree and convicted of murder in the first degree and | 
sentenced to death. Subsequently, his conviction was again re-
versed. He was then tried for a third time for murder in the first I 
degree and again convicted of murder in the second degree. Several 
years later defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus on the ground 1 
that retrial for murder in the first degree violated the double | 
jeopardy clause even though he had not raised that proposition 
at trial. The Second Circuit, per Judge Marshall, in an exhaustive | 
analysis, concluded that the Due Process Clause does have double 
jeopardy content, that under at lease one of several constitutional 
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theories, retrial for first degree murder after a verdict of mur-
der in the second degree was constitutionally infirm, and that the 
insecurity and anxiety, the opportunity of harrassment, and the 
marginal increase in the probability of convicting the accused of 
a crime he did not commit by simply trying him again, all formed 
the basis of the CourtTs fear and abhorrance of reprosecutions. 
Then, in summary, the Court held at. 867: 
We therefore hold: I. The Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes some limitations 
on a state's power to reprosecute an individual for 
the same crime. II. New York transgressed these 
limitations by reprosecuting Hetenyi for first degree 
murder following the completion of the first trial, 
notwithstanding Hetenyi's successful appeal of the 
second first degree murder conviction obtained in 
that trial. III. There is a reasonable possibility 
that Hetenyi was prejudiced in his third trial by 
the fact that he was indicted, prosecuted and charged 
with "first" degree murder; and both this possibility 
of prejudice and the fact that it was created by 
conduct that violated the accused's constitutional 
rights rendered this trial constitutionally inade-
quate. Hetenyi has been deprived of his liberty 
without due process of law, and therefore he is being 
held in custody in violation of the Constitution. 
[Emphasis added]. 
In this case, petitioner was twice tried for murder in 
the first degree in a manner violative of his constitional rights. 
Apart from the obvious fact that he is presently being punished 
twice for the same act, there is more than a "possibility" that 
his conviction for one first degree murder resulted from the fact 
that he was charged with a second. Therefore, under the authorities 
cited, he is entitled to a new trial on a proper charge. 
POINT II. SECTION 76-5-202 AND SECTION 76-3-207, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(19 73 POCKET SUPPLEMENT) UNDERWHICH APPELLANT WAS TRIED 
AND CONVICTED ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Furman v, Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 
S.Ct.2726, a five member plurality of the United States Supreme 
Court ruled: 
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The court holds that the imposition and carrying 
out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
"These cases11 referred to two from Georgia and one from Texas in 
which the rape and murder penalty statutes involved provided that '. 
the jury or court had unfettered discretion to impose either death 
or life imprisonment. Both provisions were substantially identical 
to Sec.76-30-4, Utah Code Annot, (1953) , as amended, which provision 
has since been repealed. This Court twice dealt with the impact 




 _ _ _ (1974)and 535 P.2d 82, _ _ _ _ _ U.2d _____ (1975). 
In Winkle the trial judge had ruled that the Utah alternative 
penalty provision was severable, that Furman outlawed the second 
alternative, and that thus the death penalty was mandatory upon 
conviction of first degree murder. This Court reversed and remanded 
for a new trial at which the jury was to be given the prerogative 
of determining penalty pursuant to the statute despite the contrary 
mandate of Furman. Justice Henriod filed a strong dissenting 
opinion which, with all deference, was far more consistent with 
the rule of Furman. He concluded that the trial court had extra-
polated the correct application of Furman to our statute, parti-
cularly in light of the reasoning of State v. Dickerson, 298 A. 2d 
761 (Del.1972) and State v. Waddel, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 
(1973). An examination of the majority Winkle opinion suggests 
three possible explanations for its adoption of a logically weaker 
view. First, the opinion expressed the conclusion that the Legis-
lature, in enacting prior Sec.76-30-4, had made it clear that 
the death penalty was riot to be mandatory in all cases of first degree 
murder with the result that the section had to be upheld or unvali-
dated as a whole. Thus, if it were declared unconstitutional,the stat 
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would be left with no penalty for first degree murder. Second, 
the opinion expressed obvious pique that the Supreme Court "...G^ ith 
its nine separate opinions) has created the confusion; now let 
it lead this state and others out of this morass." The third 
explanation lies in the opinion's intimation that the Utah Legis-
lature (which was to meet in special session in early 1975) would 
cure the problem by legislative action. Regardless of the Court's 
motive in holding as it did, Winkle ignores the fact that there 
is really no legitimate "confusion" about FurmanTs effect on our 
statute, and what this Court did was simply refuse to give effect 
to clear directions from the Supreme Court of the United States. 
As this Court anticipated the 1973 Legislature repealed Sec. 
76-30-4 and enacted Sec.76-5-202 and 76-3-207, apparently for 
the specific purpose of reinstating the death penalty in Utah. 
Several states had, after Furman, enacted death penalty provisions 
thought to be consistent with it because they made the death penalty 
mandatory in specific instances. Sec.76-5-202 is of the same 
pattern. Apparently not satisfied with what by itself is probably 
a constitutional death penalty provision, the Legislature (or more 
properly the drafters of those provisions) promptly enacted Sec. 
76-3-207, which renders the new statute unconstitutional in pre-
cisely the same manner as prior Sec. 76-30-4 is unconstitutional: 
the jury or court still has unfettered discretion. It is understand-
able that this Court, on the date of the first Winkle opinion, 
likely thought that the drafters of our criminal code and the Legis-
lature would come to their senses before the 1975 special session 
and remedy the new defect. The fact of the matter is that they 
did not and our code is still patently unconstitutional. All else 
having failed, the constitutional onus still fell on this Court. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The opportunity to resolve the problem came promptly 
in
 State v. Winkle (on rehearing), 535 P. 2d 82, U.2d _ _ _ _ _ 
(1975), decided after the 1975 Legislature had failed to enact 
a legislative solution. The Court's reponse to the opportunity 
is disappointing, for instead of deciding the issue it accepted 
a rather dubious cop-out proffered by the state, i.e., a consession 
that had the jury been given the discretion demanded by the statute 
it would have recommended leniency, and remanded for sentencing 
to life imprisonment. Again, Chief Justice Henriod filed a strong 
dissent accusing the majority of trying to cure the problem with 
a pair of nonsequiturs. Thus this Court has twice evaded its 
responsibility to insure constitutional trials of criminal cases 
in Utah* 
Two problems result. First, capital homicide trials 
in Utah are essentially for naught. Under Furman our statute is 
unconstitutional. If this Court chooses to follow the mandate 
of the Supreme Court it must therefore reverse appellant's con-
viction. If it chooses to continue to ignore the mandate, then 
in that event all cases tried under our first degree murder statute 
will likely result in issuance of federal writs of habeas corpus* 
Second, and more important, the contention that the 
resolution fashioned in Winkle II "removes the only matter of 
error which could be prejudicial to [defendant]" is simply false. 
There is an inherent and substantial prejudice to defendants tried 
under Sections 76-5-202 and 76-3-207 which would be sufficient 
by itself to raise a serious question of due process, but which 
is even more onerous because those provisions are otherwise uncon-
stitutional . 
At the outset of this case the jury, after being informed Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of its duty to render a verdict as to guilt or innocence, was 
told, (at T.301): 
So that you will understand at this time after the 
fact has been determined, which is basically guilty 
or innocence, or something, the court -- this is 
what they call a bifurcated trial, if the verdict 
should be guilty Murder in the First Degree, there 
is a potentional and possible and maybe I should 
change it. There is a possible of capital punishment 
or the death penalty. At that time if that is the 
verdict, there will be another trial and at that 
time, we will then go through these procedures before 
you or before me and there are alternatives here 
that must be determined before we get to that point 
and at that time there could be other evidence and 
other facts brought to your attention which would 
go to the elements of punishment that might not 
be involved in the first trial. 
This addled proposition was more clearly set forth in the Courtfs 
formal instructions after the evidence was in. The jury was aware 
of the probability that it would have a role in fashioning the 
punishment to which appellant would be subjected if he were con-
victed. 
All trial lawyers recognize the danger of compromised 
verdicts in jury trials; i.e. situations where one or two jurors 
who are holding out for acquittal can be persuaded by the other 
jurors to render a guilty verdict to a lesser and included offense. 
Sec.76-30-3 raised the similar possiblity of a compromise recom-
mendation of leniency with jurors who were holding out for con-
viction of second degree or manslaughter rather than first degree, 
murder. For a variety of reasons no issue has ever been made 
of this situation. The time has come to do so. 
In this case there was significant evidence to warrant 
conviction of a lesser offense than first degree murder. Jurors 
inclined toward that view may well have been induced to surrender 
it by an agreement of the other jurors to recommend leniency at 
the penalty hearing after a first degree verdict had been rendered. 
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This is especially true where, as in this case, juries are told 
that there will probably be other evidence involved in the penalty 
hearing going to the "elements of punishment" which is not before 
it in the initial trial. These jurors were never clearly told 
that the discretion to impose something less than the death penalty 
might not be theirs at all, but might be rested upon the court 
in its sole discretion. Even though the court imposed life imprison-
ment, a statutory scheme which makes available to the jury, if 
not encourages, compromise, works to the unfair detriment of crim-
inal defendants, particularly when the very structural statutory 
scheme which creates the danger is unconstitutional. It thus denied 
due process and warrants a new trial for second degree murder due 
to the complete invalidity of our first degree murder provisions. 
This Court should cease to evade its constitutional 
responsibilities and desist from waiting for the federal courts 
to set right what are purely state affairs. It should rule that 
Sections 76-5-202 and 76-3-207 are both unconstitutional. At the 
very least it should invalidate the latter of the two which is 
so obviously defective under Furman. The failure of this Court 
to do so will accomplish nothing more than encourage meddling by 
federal courts in what are essentially state affairs. Regressive 
and evasive holdings by state high courts have, and will continue 
to invite and abet the already dangerous centralization of judicial 
power in this country to the grave detriment of its citizens. 
If the remaining vestige of judicial federalism envisioned by the 
founding fathers is to survive, it will do so only if state courts 
of nlast resort" give firm and unswerving effect to controlling 
mandates of the United States Supreme Court, and forge progressive 
systems of state jurisprudence which will pass constitutional Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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muster. This case presents the third chance this Court has had 
to do so in the context of death penalty cases. It must not sur-
render the opportunity. 
POINT III.THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULINGS CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF 
THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 
Sec.76-2-305, Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) provides: 
MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT. (1) In any prosecution 
for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defen-
dant, at the time of the proscribed conduct, as a 
result of mental disease or defect, lacked substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law. (Emphasis added). 
(2) As used in this section, the terms "mental 
disease" or "defect" do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise 
antisocial conduct. 
Sec.76-2-306, Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) provides: 
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION. Voluntary intoxication shall 
not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state 
which is an element of the offense; however, if reck-
lessness or criminal negligence establishes an element 
of the offense and the actor is unaware of the risk 
because of involuntary intoxication, his unaware-
ness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 
Thus, if one demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court or 
jury that he falls within the provisions of Sec. 76-2-30 5 he can-
not, by reason of his incapacity to commit crime (see now repealed 
Sec. 76-1-41), be found guilty of or punished for an offense. 
However, if one establishes, upon being charged with a criminal 
offense of which a given mental state is an element, that by reason 
of voluntary intoxication he did not have the capacity to act 
with that mental state, he cannot be found guilty of that offense, 
though he might be found guilty of a lesser and included offense 
requiring only recklessness or criminal negligence as an element. 
Sec.76-2-308 Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) provides 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that both insanity and voluntary intoxication are affirmative de-
fenses, thus necessitating that they be raised by the defense. 
See, however, argument at Point IV, infra, p.48. Appellant filed 
a Notice of Intent to Rely on the Defense of Insanity (R.5),
 a 
Complaint for Determination of Sanity (R.12) and a Motion for 
Commitment to the Utah State Hospital for observation and treatment 
(R.lOb). However, no evidence was adduced that he was suffering 
from ffmental disease or defect,11 though there was evidence that y 
he was under the influence of drugs (T.H.C.) when the killings 
occurred; Statement of Facts, supra, p.3 and pp.13-15. The 
evidence raised a substantial question of whether defendant, if 
he killed the victims, could have done so "knowingly or intentionally11 
At the close of the defense case in chief, a colloquy 
occurred in chambers concerning the state's intention to call a 
psychiatrist whom the state indicated would testify that the de-
fendant was "sane." Defense counsel indicated that the defendant 
had "emphatically withdrawn the insanity question," and to remove 
all doubt, formally removed insanity as & defense. (T.1589). 
After satisfying itself that the withdrawal was voluntary, the 
Court stated: 
The Court finds and is of the opinion that there 
is evidence before the Court both as to the use 
of drugs by all of the parties present and that 
there is testimony by at least of two witnesses 
any maybe more to the effect that the defendant 
did not appear to be — was of normal mind at the 
time of the alleged shooting. The Court finds that 
there is sufficient ground to have the insanity 
question go before the jury, the question of insanity. 
So the Court so rules at this time, so you can pro-
ceed. [Emphasis added]. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Very well. The point is that it appears 
to the Court that there is a duty to determine whether 
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of facts and the Court feels that there is sufficient 
evidence that this is a question of fact that the 
Jury 's'Hould decide. [Emphasis added]. 
In a last-ditch effort to avoid the disaster which actually occurred 
in the case, defense counsel made a motion "that the Court direct 
the jury and direct the verdict that the defendant be found not 
guilty of insanity (sic)," which the Court denied; (T.1591); appar-
ently relying on the ancient rule of State v. Holt, 449 P.2d 119, 
22 U.2d 109: 
The presumption of sanity prevails only until such 
time as evidence is received at trial which tends 
to show insanity. It is then the duty of the trial 
judge to determine whether as a matter of law there 
is sufficient evidence to remove the presumption. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The CourtTs error apparently arose out of its (and counsels1) 
failure to properly distinguish "insanity" from "diminished capac-
ity." As a result the insanity question, which was not relevant, 
was presented to the jury, and it was given only a muddled and 
incomplete instruction on an issue which was more than fairly raised 
by the evidence, i.e., "diminished capacity" by reason of voluntary 
intoxication. The following are specific errors caused by this 
general problem. 
A. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. Submission of the issue of insanity to the jury and the 
introduction of testimony about it constituted a violation of appel-
lant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Without justification 
on the evidence, the Court's ruling had the effect of obliterating 
and completely overriding a tactical decision made by defense coun-
sel (in which the defendant participated after obvious consultation 
with counsel) as to the most effective manner in which to proceed. 
See, Herring v. New York, ' U.S. ' , 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 95 S.Ct. 
(June 30, 1975) regarding the role of trial counsel in state 
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prosecutions. At 45 L.Ed.2d 598, the United States Supreme Court 
The decisions of this Court have not given to these 
constitutional provisions a narrowly literalistic 
construction [provisions related to the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel ' ] . More specifically, the 
right to the assistance of counsel has been understood 
to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the 
function of counsel in defending a criminal" prosecu-
tion in accord with the traditions of the adversary 
factfinding process that has been constitutionalized 
in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
* * * 
The right to the assistance of counsel has thus 
been given a meaning that ensures to the defense 
in a criminal trial the opportunity to participate 
fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process. 
The Court has made it abundantly clear that the role of counsel 
includes the right to make all tactical decisions related to trial 
of the case except those limited by constitutional considerations. 
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 32 L.Ed.2d 358,923.Ct. 1891 
(19 72) a majority of the Supreme Court made the following comments, 
at U.S. 364, in invalidating a Tennessee statute providing that 
if the defendant elected to take the stand, he must do so prior 
to the introduction of any other defense testimony: 
Whether the defendant is to testify is an important 
tactical decision as well as a matter of constitution-
al right. By requiring the accused and his lawyer 
to make that choice without an opportunity to evaluate 
the actual worth of their evidence, the state restricts 
the defense—particularly counsel-^ in the planning of 
its case. Furthermore, the penalty for not testifying 
first is to keep the defendant off*the stand entirely, 
even though as a matter of professional judgment 
his lawyer might want to call him later in the trial. 
The accused is thereby deprived of the nguiding hand 
of counsel" in the timing of this critical element 
of his defense. While nothing we say here otherwise 
curtails in any way the ordinary power of a trial 
judge to set the order of proof, the accused and his 
counsel may not be restricted in deciding whether, 
and when in the course of presenting his defense, 
the accused should take the stand. 
The decision of defense counsel in this case is no less significant 
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and critical to the defense, particularly where he had not placed 
his client's sanity in issue. The trial judge's substitution of 
his own judgment, obviously based on a misunderstanding of the 
law, for the judgment of trial counsel, constitutes an impermissible 
invasion of appellant's right to the "guiding hand of counsel.11". 
The prejudice of this impermissible deprivation was made immediately 
and abundantly clear by the testimony elicited by the state from 
it's psychiatrist. > 
B.- TESTIMONY ADDUCED REGARDING "SANITY11 WAS IMPROPER 
AND PREJUDICIAL. The second specific error created by the court's 
erroneous ruling concerning the issue of insanity is that it allowed 
the testimony of Glen Erick Johnson, M.D., then a resident in psychi-
atry at the State of Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake City, to be 
presented to the jury. At T.1595: 
A. We proceeded to do a full investigation in the 
matter of Mr. Standrod's sanity and I engaged in sn 
extensive series of interviews, psychological testings, 
and observation of Mr. Standrod over a period of thirty 
days in our forensic psychiatry ward. 
Q. Was this done to derive at a diagnosis? 
A. Yes sir it was. 
Q. Did you derive at a diagnosis? 
A. Yes, sir. We did. 
Q. Now what was your diagnosis? 
A. My diagnosis was that of a personality disorder 
of anti-social type. 
0. What does that mean? 
A. Essentially it means a characteristic lifestyle 
evidenced by difficulty in personal relationships 
with people, but primarily difficulty with the law, 
illegal activities and manipulation of people with 
regard to the law. 
Defense counsel forthwith objected and moved for a mistrial on 
the basis that this line of questioning was totally improper, 
characterizing it as an attempt to bring in hearsay evidence of 
prior bad acts and improper evidence of character. Counsel rightly 
stated that the character of the defendant had not been placed 
in issue and that thus, the introduction of character evidence Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was totally impermissible.(T.1594-1597), The assistant attorney 
general responded as follows at T.1602: 
However, I think the character disorder described 
is typical of people who have engaged in criminal 
activities, 1 also think that what I intend to 
go into here is asking the doctor to describe what 
he found from the interview and examination of the 
defendant that he thought were from a psychiatric 
point of view significant and state those to the 
jury, so that they have some basis to determine 
how they arrived at the conclusion they reached. 
It would appear from this statement that defense counsel was correct 
in his assessment of the State's tactics. Aside from the fact 
that the testimony was irrelevant to any issue legitimately raised 
on the evidence, Mr. McCarthy's view of the permissible scope of 
examination concerning a psychiatric conclusion is clearly erron-
eous , 
Under the statutes of the State of Utah, the sanity of 
a defendant is relevant at only three points of time — the time 
of the alleged offense; the time of trial and the time of imposition 
of punishment. The only point of time to which the appellant's 
sanity was relevant is October 20, 1973; see Sec.76-2-306, 77-48-1, 
and People v. Calton, 5 U. 451, 460, 16 P.902. With this in mind, 
it is clear that the series of questions and answers put to the 
psychiatrist was improper even if sanity had been in issue, because 
they do not limit the doctor's opinion to the period of time during 
which the alleged offense occurred. The questions are clearly 
an invitation for Dr. Johnson to state a diagnosis of Mr. Standrod's 
character, as opposed to a legitimate inquiry into his sanity on 
October 20th. If Section 76-2-306 means anything near what it 
says, the only permissible and relevant question would have been: 
Doctor, in light of your examination of the defendant 
and the tests you performed on him and the interviews 
you engaged in with him, do you have an opinion Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as to whether on October 20th, 1973, defendant lacked 
substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law by reason.of mental disease 
or defect? 
An affirmative answer would have led to the obvious question: What 
is your opinion. Further questions would be limited to the founda-
tion of his opinion, and nothing further about a particular medical 
diagnosis would be relevant. 
It was clear that the doctor was not of the opinion that 
the defendant was insane. At T.1595, his diagnosis is limited 
to that of personality disorder of the anti-social type" which 
would obviously not fit within the terms of mental defect or disease 
as used in 76-2-305, especially since, contrary to the statute, 
it appears to have been based in some measure on prior criminal 
conduct. The next question "What does that mean" was nothing more 
than an invitation to character assassination, and was not reason-
ably calculated to adduce meaningful or admissible evidence. This 
testimony is atrocious in its prejudice to appellant who had admitted 
that he was sane. 
Though this precise issue has never been directly broached 
by the Supreme Court of Utah, it has been often raised in federal 
prosecutions by a statutory provision that the United States attor-
ney is entitled to require a defendant to submit to psychiatric 
evaluation prior to trial. Defendants have long asserted that 
United States attorneys were merely using this proceedure as a 
ruse to conduct detailed interrogations of criminal defendants, 
in the absence of counsel, out of the mouths of psychiatrists. 
In response to such allegations the Seventh Circuit in U.S. v. 
Bohle, 445 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1971) stated at 66: 
Such an examination [without the presence of counsel] 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because its sole purpose to enable an expert to 
form an opinion as to the defendant's mental capacity 
to form a criminal intent. It is not intended to 
aid in the establishment of facts showing that 
defendant committed certain acts constituting a 
crime. In cannot be so used, for it is impermissible 
to introduce into evidence on the issue of guilt 
any statement made by the defendant during the course 
of such examination. 
See also, U.S. v. Albright, 388 F. 2d 719 (4th Cir.1968). 
The testimony of Dr. Johnson in this case clearly violates this 
rule of due process, because he could not have known of appellant's 
"difficulty with the law, illegal activities and manipulations of 
people" had appellant not related them to him. Furthermore, the 
State's attorney had already agreed that the record of appellant's 
prior convictions (which were very limited) would not, under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, be admissible (T.1602). What he fashioned 
out of the mouth of the psychiatrist was a method of getting that 
evidence before the jury in a manner which he calculated would not 
violate the Utah Rules of Evidence, i.e., Rule 21 which provides: 
Evidence of a conviction of a witness for a crime 
not involving dishonesty or false statement shall 
be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his 
credibility, except as otherwise provided by statute, 
and Rules 46 and 47, relating d to "character evidence" which provides 
When a person's character or a trait of his character 
^
s
 in issue, it may be proved by testimony in the 
form of opinion evidence of reputation, or evidence 
of specific instances of the person's conduct, sub-
ject, however to the limitations of Rule 47 and 48 
[Rule 47 stating "in a criminal action evidence of 
a trait of an accused's character as tending to prove 
his guilt or innocence of the offense charged, if 
offered by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may 
be admitted only after the accused has entered 
evidence of his good character.] [Emphasis added]. 
It is clear that appellant had not put his character 
into question. Thus, the State's eliciting the subject testimony 
from Dr. Johnson was merely a shabby method of evading the stricture 
_ A n_ 
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of these rules and could not have helped but contribute to a juryfs 
finding of his guilt in light of the evidence in this case concern-
ing appellant fs purportedly "bizarre" lifestyle. 
This entire situation created error which violated defen-
dant's right to due process as secured to him by the Fourteenth , • 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article 
I Section 7 of Constitution of Utah. 
POINT IV. APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY ERRONEOUS 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
The jury in this case was instructed that it could find 
defendant guilty either of first or second degree murder or man-
slaughter. Manslaughter was defined in accordance with Sec.76-5-205 
which provides: 
MANSLAUGHTER. - (1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of another; 
(b) Causes the death of another under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse; 
(c) Causes the death of another under circumstances 
where the actor reasonably believes the circum-
stances provide a moral or legal justification 
or extenuation for his conduct although the 
conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. 
The court instructed that first degree murder requires "knowing" 
or "intentional" killings and that second degree murder requires 
one of the following mental elements: "Intentional or knowing" 
killing, "Inten[t] to cause serious bodily injury," or "reckless 
[conduct] which creates a grave risk of death under circumstances 
evidenc(ing) depraved indifference to human life." Thus, each 
verdict requires some finding related to the defendants state 
of mind. 
Two sections of our criminal code, both discussed supra, 
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provide relief to defendants who commit criminal acts while they 
are in some degree non compos mentis. The first relates to "mental 
illness or defect," and the second relates to "intoxication." 
Instruction No, 22-A (T.1665) is a partial verbatim 
recitation of Sec.76-2-306 Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.). ' 
You are instructed that voluntary intoxication through 
consumption by the defendant of either alcohol or 
drugs is not a defense to a criminal charge unless 
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental 
state necessary for the commission of the crimes 
charged or the included offenses. [End of instruction]. 
The instruction omits the following language constituting the 
balance of that section: 
However> if recklessness or criminal negligence 
establishes an element of an offense and the actor 
is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxi-
cation, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution 
for that offense. [Emphasis added]. 
The effect of intoxication on charges of criminal homicide 
has perplexed courts and legislatures for years. Under the Utah 
Criminal Code repealed in 1973 murder was defined as "Theunlawfull 
killing of a human being with malice aforethought", with certain 
circumstances, primarily circumstances amounting to premediditation, 
making a murder first degree. The balance of all other homicides 
which would have constituted murder at the common law were second 
degree murder. Manslaughter was defined as the "unlawful killing 
of a human being without malice"; Sections 76-30-1, 76-30-3, and 
Sec.76-30-5, Utah Code (1953), as amended. Malice was defined by 
Sec.76-30-2, Utah Code Annot. (1953) , as follows: 
Such malice may be express or implied. It is 
express when there is manifested a deliberate in-
tention unlawfully to take the life of a fellow 
creature. It is implied when no considerable pro-
vocation appears, or when the circumstances attending 
the killing"show an abandoned and malignant heart. 
The general rule as to the status of an intoxicated actor under 
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such provisions is: 
It is now generally held that intoxication may be 
considered where murder is divided into degrees, 
and in many states, may have the effect of reducing 
homicide from murder in the first degree to murder 
in the second degree. In fact, in most states, the 
only consideration given to the fact of drunkeness 
or intoxication at the time of the commission of 
a homicide is to enable the court and jury to de-
termine whether the prisoner may be guilty of murder 
in the second degree, rather than of murder in the 
first degree. The rule followed in most courts is 
that intoxication will not reduce a homicide from 
murder to manslaughter. ... 
In some states, however, either by virtue of parti-
cular statutes, or according to a general principal 
of law, intoxication may reduce murder to manslaughter. 
Where murder has not been divided into degrees, this 
position seems logical enough. Where it has been 
divided into degrees, the particular statutes defining 
second degree murder must be considered, and if a 
specific intent to take life is required to constitute 
murder in the second degree, drunkeness of the accused 
may be such as to reduce the crime from murder to man-
slaughter. 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, Sec.129 at pp.420-22. 
That the majority rule was (at least under our prior law) the law 
in Utah (see People v. Calton, 5 U.151, 16 P.902 and State v. 
Thompson, 110 U.113, 170 P.2d 153) is irrelevant because the jury 
in this case was never made aware of it. This jury was never 
instructed what verdict it must find if it found appellant was 
under the influence of drugs. Thus a jury of laymen was required 
to solve a difficult legal problem without the benefit even of 
the modest guidance provided by Sec.76-2-306. Three possible solu-
tions were available to it. 
First, it could have ignored the instructions and found 
appellant guilty of first degree murder even if it thought he was 
intoxicated to the point where his actions were not knowing and 
intentional. Second, it could have tried to fit intoxication into 
the instructions given and tried to arrive at a "proper" verdict. 
Third, it could have determined that voluntary intoxication doesn't 
really fit into the definition of anv of thp nffpn^^Q ^nA A^riAnA 
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that if it thought appellant was intoxicated it must acquit him. 
By hypothetical analysis let us examine the thought 
processes of legally unsophisticated jurors who will more than 
likely be greatly influenced by ngut reactions." It is evident 
from the verdict that all twelve of the jurors were convinced that 
appellant dealt death to the two victims. Once the jury reached 
that conclusion, the moral insult involved in the alternative of 
acquittal, even if they thought appellant killed the victims while 
intoxicated, is so great as to totally preclude any meaningful 
analysis of it, either on the theory that,!Tif that's the case, 
my conscience wonTt let me abide it,11 or that "the theory is so 
stupid that we must be wrong to have considered it.11 If the jury 
adopts the second alternative the instructions create a paradox 
from which there is no escape. The average layman would, upon a 
finding of intoxication, likely conclude that appellant could not 
have acted "knowingly or intentionally" as those terms were defined 
by the court. It follows that the jury could not convict of first 
or second degree murder under subparagraph (a) of Section 76-5-203 
(barring the multiple homicide provision of 76-5-202 to be discussed 
hereafter). Hence, it must seek a solution in subparagraphs (b) 
and (c) of Section 76-5-203. (b) requires "intent" which is already 
foreclosed. (c), however, offers escape since at first glance 
it requires only "recklessness." i^ gain, however, regular "reckless-
ness" won't do, because this subsection requires recklessness 
in "circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life." 
Question: "How can you be 'indifferent1 if you are so intoxicated 
that you have lost your capacity to understand risk?" Answer: 
"You can't." No clear resolution appears because the last sentence 
of Section 76-2-307 (which would have aided the solution) was Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not instructed. Conclusion ; ftWe probably can!t convict of second 
degree at all,'1 Hence, !?Let!s examine manslaughter.11 
Proposition: "The judge said i\re can convict of manslaugh-
ter if we think Standrod "recklessly" killed these people or did 
so "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." 
The judge said a person is "reckless with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct, ... when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances 
exist or the result will occur (T.1664)." "'Awareness1 and 'con-
sciousness' are inconsistent with intoxication, so that doesn't 
fit." Again, the failure to instruct the last sentence of Sec. 
76-2-307 has left the jury without legal information necessary 
to a fair and meaningful consideration of this possible verdict. 
"As to 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance' the judge told 
us what that is — 
Extreme mental or emotional disturbance, as referred 
to in this instruction, is that which might result 
from extreme provocation that would give rise to 
irristible passion in the mind of a reasonable man 
or upon sudden quarrel or other circumstances which 
reasonably explain or excuse the conduct. Such cir-
cumstances are to be judged and the reasonableness 
of the explanation or excuse for the conduct are to 
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in 
the defendant's situation at the time of the alleged 
homicides under the circumstances as he believes them 
to be (T.1667); — 
and it is not applicable on the evidence. Since there is no claim 
of "justification" we can't find him guilty of manslaughter. Hence, 
this result: 
THE FOREMAN: Since we all think he did it, I think 
we should convict him of first degree. 
JUROR; But for that, we must find that he acted 
knowingly or intentionally or at least more culpably 
than with mere recklessness. We all think he was 
drugged. 
FORMAN: Well, there's no way to solve all the 
problems. I'm too confused and hungry to solve 
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them. I say to heck with it* Let's ignore that 
requirement and convict him of first degree. After 
all, we can always recommend life over death and 
salve our consciences that way. 
ELEVEN JURORS: We agree. 
The legislature has mandated the existence of the defense of intoxi-
cation to specific intent crimes. Neither it nor the court gave 
it any rational meaning to the twelve laymen who decided appellant's 
fate; thus, due process was denied. (For the proper definition 
of fTdue process" see dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan in State 
v. Phillips, No,13816 in the Supreme Court of Utah, 9/18/75). 
This court must, consistent with its traditional judicial role 
in construing statutes, forge a rule to be clearly applied in the 
retrial of this case and in others based on similar facts. 
Three possible rules present themselves. First, the court 
could adopt the position impliedly taken by the trial court in 
this case and require juries to be instructed to acquit if they 
find perpetrators of criminal homicides to have been intoxicated. 
This rule is unacceptable because it flies in the face of the 
Legislature's obvious intent to limit the Sec.76-2-306 defense 
only to specific intent crimes. Further, such a rule would be 
so inconsistent with common sense and traditional standards of 
conduct that juries would ignore it (probably with justification). 
Thus, due process would always be violated in such cases. 
Second, this Court can rule that, despite evidence that 
a defendant's conduct falls within the "circumstances" set forth 
in Sec.76-5-202, a first degree verdict is precluded if the de-
fendant is sufficiently intoxicated, but the jury may convict 
intoxicated actors of second degree under Sec. 76-5-203(c) which 
requires "[reckless]... conduct which creates a grave risk of death 
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ference to human life.1-1 This is the only second degree provision 
which fits because paragraphs (a) and (b) both appear to reouire 
specific intent, and paragraph(d) is inapplicable. This rule does 
violence to the ?fcircumstancen scheme of' Sec. 76-5-202 and, though 
it is consistent with the majority common law rule, may not be 
justified under the limiting strictures of this Courtfs role in 
statutory construction. 
The third rule is clearly preferable though the legis-
lature may have rendered an already difficult problem impossible 
by its deletion of the phase "under circumstances not constituting 
manslaughter" from Sec.76-5-202 by a 1975 amendment not applicable 
to this case. To be most consistent with the 1973 statutory scheme 
the trial court should have instructed that if the jury found appel-
lant to have been too intoxicated to act knowingly and intentionally 
it must find him guilty of manslaughter on one of two theories: 
either that his conduct was reckless (so that the uninstructed 
portion of Sec.76-2-307 would have been relevant to permit convic-
tion); or, more appropriately, that sufficient voluntary intoxi-
cation constitutes "extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." It is signifi-
cant that this section uses the word "disturbance" as opposed 
to the "mental disease or defect" language of Sec.76-2-305, supra, 
related to the defense of insanity. Under a common sense and use 
analysis of the word "disturbance" one is mentally "disturbed" 
when, by reason of hallucinogenic drugs, his mind is not functioning 
in a normal fashion. The requirement that there be a "reasonable 
explanation" for the mental disturbance is clearly satisfied when 
it is proven that the defendant has ingested hallucinogenic drugs 
because the scientific data that such drugs do cause mental "dis-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
turbanceM is abundant, 
A second instructional error occurs at T.1665 where, 
though the court instructs that nyou cannot find murder in the first 
degree under circumstances which constitute manslaughter/1 it failed 
to instruct that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the circumstances of the crime did not constitute manslaughter. 




i U.S. • , 44 L.Ed.2d 508, 95 S.Ct.''_ (June 1975), the United States Supreme Court, without dissent, not only struck down a Maine 
statute which placed on defendant the burden of proving by a fair I 
preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the uheat of passion 
on sudden provocation" (before he was entitled to be convicted 
of manslaughter rather than murder), but clearly held (at 44 L.Ed.2d 
522): 
We therefore hold that the due process clause requires 
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion when the issue is properly presented in a homi-
cide case. [Emphasis added]. 
In reliance on Mullaney, the Kings County New York Supreme 
Court in People v. Balogun, _ _ _ N.E. , 17 Cr.L. 2486 (8/19/75) 
held unconstitutional a state statute providing: I 
... It is an affirmative defense [to a murder charge] 
that ... (a) the defendant acted under the influence I 
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was ] 
a reasonable explanation or excuse ... 
The substantive language of that provision w&s almost identical to I 
Sec. 76-5-202, U.C.A. (1974 Pocket Supp.) except that it placed '-. 
the burden of showing such circumstances on the defendant whereas I 
our law is silent on burden of proof. Silence in the instructions I 
to the jury in this case cannot suffice as a constitutional sub-
stitute to clear instruction that the state had the burden of proving | 
bevon? a reasonable doubt that appellant's alleged acts did not
 f 
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constitute manslaughter as is required by Mullaney, supra. 
Mullaney has a further application to the partial defense 
of intoxication which is, like the New York provision invalidated 
in Balogun, an affirmative defense under Sec.76-2-308, U.C.A. (1974* 
Pocket Supp.). In the instant case there was ample evidence that 
appellant was intoxicated on October 20, 1975, so that that issue 
was "properly presented/1 In Maine "heat of passionn and in New 
York "extreme mental disturbance" are partial defenses to murder. 
In Utah "intoxication" is a partial defense which should reduce 
first degree murder to second degree or manslaughter. The statute 
which requires defendants to prove intoxication is unconstitutional. 
As to our manslaughter section as a whole, the Legislature, when 
it first enacted Sec.76-5-202, the section under which this case 
was tried, recognized the very proposition enunciated in Mullaney, 
and prohibited conviction of murder "under circumstances constitut-
ing manslaughter." It was by afterthought (and perhaps as part 
of what is beginning to look like a deliberate, perverse, and 
continuing effort to render our entire criminal code unconstitu-
tional) that the Legislature undid itself by permitting the burden 
of proving "circumstances constituting manslaughter" to be placed 
back on defendants. Mullaney,as Furman, supra, is the law. It 
is not unreasonable, absurd or an offensive insult to state sov-
ereignty. While this court must reverse this case because of the 
errors in the instructions discussed in this Point, in doing so 
it easily could and should enlist Utah in the forefront of pro-', 
gressive states by adopting the rule of Mullaney and requiring 
that juries in all murder cases be instructed that they must find 
that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime 
is not manslaughter before it can convict a defendant of murder. 
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Trial courts and lawyers in this state need this kind of specific 
guidance. Providing it is the clear duty of this Court. 
POINT V. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE PROMISES OR AGREEMENTS NOT TO PROSECUTE 
WITNESSES AND ACCESSORIES DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS. 
In GigTio v. United States, 40 5 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed.2d 
104, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972) the Supreme Court of the United States, 
citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, authoritatively held that 
a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose to the jury an 
''understanding or agreement" as to the future prosecution of a 
witness. The basis of the holding was that 
When the "reliability of a given witness may well 
be determinative of guilt or innocence," nondisclosure 
of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the 
general rule derived from Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 at 87, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), 
"that suppression of material evidence justifies 
a new trial irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution.'"] 
A violation of this duty necessititates a new trial if it can fairly 
be said that the testimony of the witness involved was material, 
that is, if there is any "reasonable likelihood [it would] have 
affected the judgment of the jury;" Giglio, supra, at 154, citing 
Napue, supra, at 271. The Giglio court stated that credibility 
of the witness there involved was an important issue in the case 
and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future pro-
secution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was 
entitled to know it. 
In the instant case the testimony of Richard Higgins 
and Paul Kunzel was the primary evidence against appellant and 
certainly the most damaging. Kunzel said he heard the shots, took 
about sixty seconds in walking into the cabin, and saw appellant 
standing near the south door of the cabin; while Kunzel saw no weapon 
nor any other person in the cabin, he did say that appellant had 
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a strange look on his face and that appellant said something 
to the effect of "So-what, you've got a little blood on you." 
Statement of Facts, supra, P.6. Higgins1 testimony was even more 
critical. He didnft distinguish a weapon, but saw flames coming 
from appellant at the time he heard shots, saw the wounds, and saw 
the male victim crying as he was trying to rise. Statement of Facts, 
supra, p.5. 
The foregoing establishes two errors in appellant's trial. 
A. No disclosure was made to the jury of what must 
have been at least an implied agreement not to prosecute Higgins 
and Kunzel, Candice Earle and Layton Roselund were initially 
charged with first degree murder and later granted immunity. 
However, Higgins and Kunzel were not arrested, charged, nor granted 
immunity. While appellant can point to no evidence of an agreement 
by the state that they would not be prosecuted, it is inconceiveable 
that they did not at least have an "understanding", Giglio, supra, 
that they would not be prosecuted if their testimony at trial was 
substantially similar to earlier statements they had given to investi-
gatory and prosecutorial people. That Higgins had an "understanding" 
with the state which he felt was contingent on the quality of his 
testimony may be demonstrated by contrasting his serious equivocation 
in identifying appellant as the killer when questioned by defense 
counsel (T.799) with his carefully structured and impermissibly lead-
ing rehabilitation on that issue at the hands of the prosecutor after 
the lunch recess (T.813). It is obvious that the credibility of 
these two witnesses was a crucial question in appellant's trial, 
and the jury was entitled to know of any understanding on their 
part as to a future prosecution as an aid to assessing the credibil-
ity of their testimony. Yet the State, far from being candid about 
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the situation, at least obscured the issue if it did not outright 
mislead the jury. In closing argument the prosecution said the 
following, at T.1762-63: 
Now, now I submit to you that those who helped 
bury bodies, those who helped in any way, in this 
are accessories after the fact, but they didn't kill 
them. We have a right to grant immunity in exchange 
for truthful testimony and that we did to [Candice 
Larle and Layton Roselund] . There's no point in 
arresting the other two by the time we get these things 
to fit. Kunzel came as soon as he actually reached 
home and had the contact. Higgins came over volun-
tarily. You don't need to arrest that kind of 
people. If you have to arrest them, you can very 
easily wherever they are. You can issue a warrant 
for them and bring them back as a material witness 
if they won't come, but you don't have to charge 
them for something they didn't do because it might 
be possible to conceivably charge them. We all have 
a sense of duty. We all have an obligation to do 
justice, the prosecutors, the police, the judges 
and juries. [Emphasis added]. 
Whether the state could have charged Higgins and Kunzel as 
accessories under our new code which repealed Sec.76-1-42,U.C.A. 
(1953) as amended is open to question. Nevertheless, the prosecutor's 
rather cavalier statement of the law coupled with the fact that Layton 
Roselund (who actually did no more than Higgins and Kunzel) was act-
ually charged with murder, undoubtedly convinced Higgins and Kunzel 
that they could be charged and likely convicted if they didn't 
properly tow the mark as witnesses. 
Telling the jury that the State has a right to grant 
a witness immunity in exchange for "truthful" testimony (which 
is an incorrect statement of the law in any event; see argument 
immediately following) is an obvious implication that the testimony 
of the witness has been truthful. To immediately follow that state-
ment by saying that two other witnesses, and the most crucial, 
did not even have to be arrested because of the kind of people 
that they were is a completely unwarranted bolstering of the wit-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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nesses1 testimony, especially given the state's obfuscation of 
the critical issue, i.e. the testimony must have been given by 
the witnesses in the expectation that if it was the witnesses would 
not be prosecuted. 
Based on the holding of Gigllo, supra, appellant's con-
viction should therefore be reversed. See also U.S. v. Tashman, 
478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1973) in which the appellant's co-defendant 
had negotiated an agreement to plead guilty to one count in exchange 
for a joint recommendation, subsequently honored by the court. 
The agreement was finalized in proceedings from which the appellant 
and his counsel had been excluded. The circuit reversed due to 
the government's failure to disclose the plea and sentence of the 
co-defendant to appellant prior to trial with the following language 
at 131: 
The action of counsel for Osbrach and the Government 
acquiesced in by the court, was so prejudicial ... as 
to require a new trial. Being unaware of what had oc-
curred behind the closed doors of the courtroom,appel-
lants had no effective way of combatting the damaging 
testimoy elicited by the Government from Osbrach. ... 
Under the circumstances the jury had no way of knowing 
what interest Osbrach had in testifying. 
We need not speculate on what effect knowledge of 
the secret contingent agreement would"TTave had on 
the jury. The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
the failure of the government to disclose to a jury 
plea-bargaining negotiations with a key witness deprives 
a defendant of constitutional due process. [Emphasis added] 
Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1932 (6th Cir.1974) is also squarely 
in point. In that case the conviction was reversed by reason of 
a statement made by the prosecutor to the jury that a key witness 
(who had received certain assurances from the prosecutor regarding 
assistance in obtaining probation) had nothing to gain by testifying. 
That is exactly what happened in the case at bar when the jury was 
told during closing argument that the State "did not need to arrest 
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that kind of people*" 
(T)he basic tenent of Giglio does not depend on whether 
misleading information was given to the jury in the 
form of a closing argument by a prosecutor rather 
than through the testimony of a witness . ... The 
critical error was that the prosecutor deliberately 
misled the jury by assuring it that [the witness] 
had nothing to gain by giving his testimony;" 
Armour, supra, at 10 37. 
Finally, attention is called to Birkholder v. State, 
493 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Ct.Cr.App/ 1973) which makes it abundantly 
clear that the Texas court's reading of Giglio does not require, 
as a condition of reversal, even disclosure to the witness himself 
that immunity from prosecution has been granted. In Birkholder 
a lawyer told his client only that if he would testify ffit would 
help him". In reversing for failure to disclose this to the jury, 
the court stated: 
One reasonable inference to be drawn from [the wit-
ness T actions in denying knowledge of the deal in 
a qualified way] is that he knew of the Stateys 
plan not to prosecute but also knew not to mention 
it for fear of jeopardizing the entire scheme. 
Whether or not this is true is not for us to decide. 
The point is that the jury should have been given 
the opportunity to decide [the witness'] credibility 
for itself. The trial court's refusal to require the 
disclosure of the State's plan not to prosecute [the 
witness] deprived the jury of that function. [Empha-
sis added]. 
B, All parties to the trial misconstrued and misstated 
the effect of the immunity statute, thus depriving the jury of 
an additional critical factor in assessing the testimony of key 
witnesses. The grant of immunity to Layton Roselund was disclosed 
to the jury, at T.991, as follows: 
Q. Now, you were initially charged with this crime 
with other people; were you not? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You were granted immunity by the State in ex-
'change for your truthful testimony; were you not? 
' A. That is correct. [Emphasis added]. 
The grant of immunity to Candice Earle was disclosed to the jury Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at T.1116 as follows: 
Q. Now, it is true, is it not, Miss Earle, that you 
were arrested at the same time the defendant and Mr. 
Roselund were arrested? 
A. I was. 
Q. Arrested in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is also true, is it not, that the State has 
granted immunity from any prosecution in this case in 
' exchange for your personal testimony? [Emphasis addecF]. 
It is obvious that the State's counsel did not wish to 
imply to the jury that Candice Earle's testimony was truthful. 
As to her he made the exchange for "personal" testimony, yet in 
every other mention of immunity to the jury his exchange was for 
"truthful" testimony; T.1762; T.991; and see T.1257-1264. Of 
course, Ms. Earle's testimony had not been particularly helpful 
to the State, and she was at least appellant's roommate if not what 
the State referred to as his "commonlaw wife", and she is now Mrs. 
Standrod. 
The point is that the State does not grant immunity in 
exchange for anything, let alone "truthful testimony.", The relevant 
statute is 77-45-21 Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) which pro-
vides as follows: 
In any investigation or prosecution of a criminal 
case [the State] shall have the power to grant immuni-
ty from prosecution to any person ... called as a wit-
ness in behalf of the State of Utah whenever the [State] 
deems that the testimony of such person is necessary 
to the investigation or prosecution of such a case. No 
prosecution shall be instituted against a person for 
any crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged 
under this action (sic) provided that should the person 
testify falsely, nothing contained herein shall be 
construed to prevent prosecution for perjury. 
The legislative intent of that section was obviously 
to force the testimony of a witness who is otherwise unwilling 
to testify. The gist of the section is compulsion rather than 
exchange. If Layton Roselund was being compelled to testify the 
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jury was entitled to know that fact in order to assess his cred-
ibility. The State on the other hand planted the unwarranted im-
pression in the jury's mind that his testimony was necessarily 
"truthful" since it was given in exchange for immunity. The Court 
ratified the attempt. At T.1257: 
THE COURT: ... (B)asically ... the statute is ...that 
the State...could grant immunity at any stage in the 
proceedings in return for the truthful testimony of a 
witness and that, in the event the testimony was not true, 
then the immunity was no longer in force. Now, that is 
in essence. Is that right, counsel? [Emphasis added]. 
MR. MCCARTHY; Yes. 
Wrong, And earlier in the proceedings the Court had instructed 
the jury as follows, at T.1237: 
•..(D)uring the recess the Court checked the transcript 
and ... the law and thought maybe a word of explanation 
that the Court has advised both counsel the immunity 
factor. It is not material; it is not relevant. * .. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Of course, a grant of immunity to any key witness remains throughout 
a critically material factor vis-a-vis the jury's ability to access 
the credibility of the witness. Even though defense counsel obvious-
ly didnft fully understand the immunity concept either, he did 
request a pertinent instruction which the court refused at T.1639: 
THE COURT: ... Instruction No.C where the prosecuting 
attorney has made promise of immunity and you asked 
the Court to instruct that it is not regarded with 
favor and should be closely scrutinized. That's denied. 
If refusal of that instruction was not error, error was committed 
in that the court never did adequately explain the consequences 
of a grant of immunity, instruct as to immunity being a factor 
affecting credibility, and it (the court) misled the jury regarding 
the materiality of grants of immunity by ratifying the state's 
reference to such grants as being in exchange for "truthful11 test-
imony. The error is so plain and fundamental that appellant's 
conviction should be reversed. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT VI. APPELLANTS CONVICTION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED 
IN VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
The problem with this case is that it is at best a man-
slaughter case which resulted in a first degree murder conviction, 
leading one to wonder how the state accomplished this feat. The 
following violations of appellant1s Fifth Amendment rights certainly 
contributed. 
A, Violation of Miranda v. Arizona. 
When law enforcement officers arrived at appellantfs 
cabin they asked appellant to identify himself. According to the 
testimony of David G. Little (T.565) appellant indicated that he 
was Standrod and acknowledged that he knew Richard Frank Higgins 
and had come from Las Vegas within the last two or three days* 
Trooper Little testified that appellant then said, MI donTt want 
to say anything more about it." It was at that point appellant 
was placed under arrest for first degree murder and given a Miranda 
warning which though not seriously deficient, was misleading: "You 
can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer 
any questions or make any statements." 
Appellant was then handcuffed, "And from that point there 
was some conversation that took place. I asked one or two questions 
and then someone else asked some questions;" testimony of Trooper 
Little at T.566. 
At the trial the state took great pains to emphasize 
that everything related to appellant's arrest and investigation 
'was right and proper, this in order to emphasize for the jury a 
supposed implication of guilt from a statement then made by appel-
lant. At T.568-569; 
Q, (By Mr. McCarthy): Now, Trooper Little, what 
was the reason that you read the Miranda warning 
instead of giving it from your head? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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* 
A. Well, the main reason was to make certain that 
it was right and proper and to secure the arrest. m 
& & "k ™ 
Q. Was there any other conversation in the defendant's I 
presence between any of the officers and any of the • 
persons arrested that you can now recall? V v 
A. There was some conversation that took place. I 
I do remember that information was volunteered — I 
and the other two subjects that had been placed under 
arrest. • 
Q. What information was that? I 
A. The defendant made a statement that it was an 
accident. He, I might describe --
0. Please do. Set up the situation. I 
A. The situation. We were all standing in front " 
of the sheriff's car, right in front of the car, 
and he sat back and he leaned on the front of the I 
car and he shuffled his feet, and he would look up I 
into the air and he shook his head and he said,"This 
was an accident." • 
Just to make sure that the jury didn't miss anything 
the state had Deputy Sheriff Stephan C. Turner testify that after I 
the "Miranda" warning he heard appellant say that it was an accident; 
(T.581). I 
The state had a little more difficulty in getting the l 
information out of Officer Francis J. Kelley (at T.587): 
Q. (By Mr. McCarthy): Officer Kelley, let me go I 
back a little further in your testimony: aside from ' 
your answer to the question by the defendant, yes, 
he knew why you were there, apparently, was there I 
any other statement made by the defendant prior to • 
the time you went up the hill that you recall? 
A. Yes. He said it was an accident and that he I 
kept trying to xvake them up. | 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. . 
1602 (1966) clearly establishes that admission of the testimony 
concerning this statement of defendant's was an error of constitutional 
proportions. At the outset it is clear that the Miranda requirement 
of in custody interrogation was here met inasmuch as appellant had | 
been arrested for first degree murder. It is equally clear that "', 
after appellant said that "he didn't want to say anything more about Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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it" the officers were not entitled to question him further and 
anything he did say as a result of further questioning was inadmis-
sable. In Miranda the Supreme Court clearly stated, at 384 U.S. 
473, that 
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any 
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes 
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. 
At this point he has shown that he intends to exer-
cise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement 
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot 
be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or 
otherwise. (Emphasis added). 
The substance of the Miranda opinion, of course, was to ensure that 
the individual's constitutional right to chose between silence and 
speech is not ignored or evaded by law enforcement officials, and 
thus its emphasis on the necessity of demonstrating procedural 
safeguards and effective apprisal of rights. The Court stated 
at 384 U.S. 467: 
We have concluded that without proper safeguards 
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons 
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual's will to resist and to compel him to 
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. 
In order to combat these pressures and to permit 
a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately 
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise 
of tITose rights must be fully honored. [Emphasis addedj . 
A once stated warning, delivered by those who will 
conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice 
to [the end of assuring that the individual's right 
to choose between silence and speech remains unfet-
tered] among those who most require' knowledge of 
their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators 
is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end; 
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 469. 
That the once stated warning given in this case was ineffective 
is apparent for several reasons First, appellant said that he 
did not want to say anything further, yet the police officers 
questioned him and he made the statement in question. Second, Digitize  by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there is massive evidence in the record about the use of drugs 
by all parties involved on the day prior to appellant's arrest 
and the overall tenor of the record casts grave doubt on 
the proposition that appellant was free from the influence of drugs 
at the time of his arrest and the receipt of the warning. This 
is further substantiated by the statement taken by police officers 
from appellant approximately two-and-one-half days later, a transcript 
of which statement is found following R.17. This Court need only 
read briefly through that statement to become convinced that even 
at that time defendant was obviously confused and incoherent, thus 
rendering absurd any argument that he "knowingly and intentionally" 
waived his privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 475. 
This error would perhaps not be substantially a serious 
one if the testimony had just come in and the state had not attempted 
to capitalize upon it. Having laid the ground work however, the 
state did not fail to seize the opportunity to milk the statement 
for more than it was reasonably worth. In closing argument, at 
T.1697, the state argued: 
Then the other inconsistency with that statement 
is that: remember when they first saw the police 
car? What did he actually do? He went out to cover 
up the mattress and then heTs got to 
get this thing off his conscience so when the police 
were there do you remember the first thing he told 
them? "There's been an accident" and that was as 
far as it went. 
In its final closing argument at T.761 £t seq. , the state had the 
following to say: 
I don't know why for sure why he killed those people. 
It's only in his power to tell and if you remember, 
one of the first things Trooper Little did was give 
the Miranda warning. ... They have a right to raise 
these rights and the whole thing is there in Exhibit 
1 if I recall correctly. He says it's an accident 
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and he realizes he doesn't have to say anything more. 
Maybe, Candy tells him to shut up. I don't know. 
* * # * 
Nov/, I think we have hammered this enough. I think you can 
see why we don't have to prove motive. Motive is within 
the ability of the defendant to tell us 5ut we can't foTce 
him to talk. We can't grill him until he breaks... \ Ft 
went out long ago which is why we have that kind of a flag. 
You don't torture a man, you-don't put him in a chamber, 
for example, and you can't run him through an inquisition. 
We respect the man's rights. [Emphasis added]. 
The state's contention that because appellant said it was an 
accident he was somehow admitting guilt was, by itself, prejudicial, 
the implication being that the statement containing an affirmative 
statement of what had happened, contradicted appellant's in-court de-
nial of any knowledge of the circumstances of the killings. Had the 
statement been used in rebuttal it may have been admissible; Oregon 
v. Hassy U.S.__,43 L.Ed.2d 570,95 S.Ct. (1975),but its admission 
as direct evidence in the state's case in chief violated Miranda. 
B. Comment on appellant's silence. 
The statement quoted supra, this page, was a direct comment by 
the state upon the fact that appellant exercised his Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent. Evidence that appellant did so has no probative 
value, but does have a substantial potential for prejudice. "The dan-
ger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight to the de-
fendant's previous silence than is warranted,fl and it creates a "strong 
negative inference" in the mind of the jury; U. S. v. Hale, U.S. ,45 
L.Ed.2d 99, 107, 95 S.Ct. (1975). The Hale opinion concluded that "re-
spondent's silence during police interrogation lacked significant pro-
bative value and...any reference to his silence under such circumstances 
carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact." 
Miranda,supra, simply prohibited such evidence at n.37,384 U.S. 
468: 
...[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exer-
cising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police.,. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, 
use the fact that he stood mute or claimed his priv-
ilege in the face of accusation. 
See also, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L.Ed.2d 
106, 85 S.Ct. 1229 (1965): 
(T)he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to 
the federal government, and its bearing on the states 
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either 
comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence 
or instruction by the court that such silence is 
evidence of guilt. 
In U.S. v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (1970) the prosecution elicited 
testimony from the arresting officer that he had given the defendant 
the Miranda warning; the officer was then asked if the defendant 
made any further statement to him, to which he answered, ,fno". 
In closing argument the government argued (reported at 206): 
On the otherhand, you have the testimony of the 
federal agents who have thoroughly inventoried every-
thing and advised the defendant of his constitutional 
rights, and he made no statement. 
Wouldn't you think if all he is doing is a little 
experiment he would say to the agents, "My gosh, 
there is a mistake here, hold it.M 
* ft ft ft 
And as far as him making any statement to them or 
telling them anything, they gave him what is under 
the law the full advisement of his constitutional 
rights and he made no statements. He didn't explain 
anything. Complete silence. 
The Court stated: 
Since the Miranda warnings here given were not intended 
as a foundation for the admission of a voluntary 
inculpatory statement of the defendant, this testimony 
served no probative purpose and did no more than 
turn on the red light of potential prejudice involving 
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. We are 
inclined to the view that this testimony, standing 
alone, might well be considered harmless, but such 
is not this case [because of the closing argument 
quoted above]. 
ft ft ft ft 
In
 United States
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588], we clearly stated that the constitutional right 
to remain silent at the time of arrest was as funda-
mental as the right not to testify and neither could 
be subject of argumentative comment by the prosecution. 
We there stated that to do so was error "so plain, 
fundamental, and serious that we should consider 
it, although timely objection was not made thereto 
in the trial court/1 
We decline to weigh comparative prejudice wrhen the cali-
brator" can only be the quantity of comment violative^ 
of constitutional rights. [Emphasis addedj. 
The final opinion clearly eliminates any quibble the state 
may wish to make about waiver by non-objection. See also, State 
v. Scott, 22 U.2d 27, 447 P.2d 908 (1968) and State v. Cobo, 90 
U.89 P. 2d 95 (1936). In addition, the fact that appellant took 
the stand and testified at his trial can be of no help to the state, 
because the state introduced the testimony it its case in chief. 
If the testimony had not been introduced there ivould certainly have 
been less reason for appellant to testify (in an attempt to explain 
the testimony); see argument at pp.35-36, supra. 
POINT VII.THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED 
PURSUANT TO AN INVALID SEARCH WARRANT. 
At approximately 2:00 oTclock p.m. on October 22nd, 1973, 
two days after the killings and one day after the afternoon upon 
which appellant, Candice Earle and Layton Roselund were arrested, 
Julian B. Fox, a Highway Patrol Sergeant, presented an Affidavit 
in support of a Motion for a Search Warrant to Clifford Heaton, 
Justice of the Peace of Kane County. The Affidavit subscribed and 
sworn to by Fox is attached hereto as Appendix A. Pursuant to 
the Affidavit, Heaton issued a search warrant, attached as Appendix 
B, which commanded seizure from the property of appellant of the 
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One or more corpse buried upon said property, lethal 
weapons, drugs, chemicals, blood stains, finger prints, ,, 
foot prints, shovels or tools used for the purpose of 
burying bodies, blood stained rugs, clothing and equipment. -1 
Acting on the warrant, on the afternoon of the 22nd, officers seized m 
i 
a large number of items from appellant's premises, including but 
not limited to those set forth on the penciled notation appended j 
to the Return attached hereto as Appendix B(l). -
Sergeant Fox, however, the affiant upon whose word the ™ 
warrant was issued, did not have personal knowledge of any of the I 
facts set forth in his Affidavit. The only statement of "underlying 
facts" required by Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Ut.471, 93 P.2d 920, is | 
contained in paragraphs two and three of the Affidavit, i.e., 2."... -
affiant received notification from a member of the Las Vegas Police 
Department that a witness had reported to them that a murder had . 1 
been committed in Kane County ... and that the victims had been 
buried...[and that certain individuals had been present]." During | 
the trial, however, Fox admitted that he had never talked to any m 
member of the Las Vegas Police Department, but had received information 
concerning the murders from a Sergeant Pierson of the Utah Highway I 
Patrol, and from reading a radio log. P.T.85* Thus, all the infor-
mation which he had when he approached Clifford Heaton for a search | 
warrant was triple hearsay from an informant. ••"••"'• 
The second set of operative underlying facts is contained ' 
in paragraph three wherein Fox swears that he was present, with I 
other police officers, at Navajo Lakes at a time when Kenneth Stand-
rod, Candice Earle, and Layton Roselund, after having been advised J 
of their rights,ndid voluntarily acknowledge that two persons... g 
were killed in the home...[and] that their bodies were buried... 
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upon property where the home is situated.M This statement was 
false. Trooper Little of the Utah Highway Patrol said he went to 
the cabin site on the late affternoon of October 21st with Trooper 
Steve Turner and Francis Kelley and Norman Swapp of the Kane County 
Sheriff's Office (P.T.75-77), and that they arrested Roselund, 
Earle, and Standrod and transported them to the Kane County Jail* 
The first time Julian Fox ever got to the premises was at approx-
imately 9:30 o'clock a.m. on the 22nd,at which time all of the 
persons present when the police first arrived on the 21st had been 
transported to jail.(P.T.81). Therefore, any information Fox had 
was hearsay derived by him from some person who is unnamed in the 
Affidavit. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has dealt exhaustively 
with the technical requirements of affidavits in support of search 
warrants and particularly those related to the extent to which hear-
say information may be utilized. 
In Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 11 L.Ed.2d 
887, 84 S.Ct. 825 (1964),rehearing denied 377 U.S. 940, the Court 
clearly indicated that hearsay is competent as the basis of a 
search warrant and ruled that despite minor factual inaccuracies 
(not going to the integrity of the personal knowledge of the affiant) 
affidavits are sufficient even though the identity of the informant 
delivering the information is withheld. Only months later, in 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 1509,(1964), 
the Court examined for the first time the question of the quality 
required of hearsay before it is sufficient to justify the issuance 
of a warrant. The Court set forth a rule, still controlling, 
which the headnote writer summarized as follows: 
As a matter of constitutional law, an affidavit 
reciting that the affiant received reliable infor-
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mation from a credible person, and that affiant be-
lieved, that narcotics were being kept at described 
premises for illegal sale and use, is not sufficient 
to establish probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant, since the affidavit states mere con-
clusions of an unidentified informant and contains 
no affirmative allegations that the affiant or the 
informer spoke with personal knowledge of the matters 
contained in the affidavit. 
One year later the Court decided U.S.' vY Ventre'sca, 380 U.S. 102, 
13 L.Ed.2d 684, 85 S.Ct. 741 (1965) in which the Aguilar holding 
was reaffirmed. The court stated that affidavits may be based 
on hearsay if the basis for the credibility of the hearsay statements 
is specified, but that mere conclusions were not sufficient. 
See, also, McRae v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, 87 S.Ct. 
(1956), rehearing denied 386 U.S. 1042 (1967). In 1969 in Spinelli 
W U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969), the 
Court, Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for the majority, synthesized 
all these cases into a single rule which is still controlling. 




 A'guiTar» supra, rule: (1) In passing on the validity of a 
search warrant, a reviewing court may consider only the information 
brought to the attention of the magistrate; (2) Aguilar requires, 
and the Court affirms the proposition, that in order to pass con-
stitutional muster an affidavit supporting a search warrant, if 
based on hearsay information must first set forth underlying circum-
stances sufficient to enable the magistrate independently to judge 
the validity of the informant's conclusion concerning the substance 
of the affidavit. (3) The affidavit must recite the facts upon 
which the affiant relies to conclude that the hearsay information 
recited is reliable. Mr. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, 
sets the rule forth at U.S., 393 as follows: 
If the affidavit rests on hearsay—an informants 
report—what is necessary under Aguilar is one of 
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two things: the informant must declare either (1) that 
he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts as-
serted; or (2) that his information is hearsay, but 
there is good reason for believing it - perhaps one of 
the usual grounds for crediting hearsay information* 
The affidavit involved in this case (Appendix A) fails the tests set 
forth in Aguilar and Spinelli under any construction of the facts. 
First, all the statements made in the affidavit subscribed by Julian 
Fox were false, by his own subsequent admission. Second, all the 
information Fox had was hearsay derived from other law enforcement 
officers who remained unnamed in the affidavit and concerning whose 
credibility nothing whatever is said. Without something on the 
face of the affidavit to indicate the source and quality of the 
hearsay information it contains, it flies in the face of Aguilar 
an
^ Spinelli, both supra. The third and worst failure concerns 
the hearsay from the Las Vegas Police. For an unidentified witness1 
statement to Detective Levos to have been sufficient the affidavit 
would have had to recite some information from which the magistrate 
could independently find that Higgins was a reliable informant. 
But no such information appears on the face of the affidavit and 
Julian Fox, the affiant, didn't even have the information directly 
from the witness, but had it from the witness through Detective 
Levos, then to Trooper Pierson, and then to Fox. Such a chain is 
too tenuous to justify a massive invasion of an individual's privacy. 
Thus, under applicable standards the search warrant in this case 
is totally inadequate, being based on a fatally defective affidavit. 
Hence the search of appellant's cabin was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteen Amendment (see Aguilar, supra, at 378 U.S. 
109). Failure to suppress all evidence seized pursuant thereto 
was reversable error. 
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Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United 
States has ever squarely decided whether a violation of constitu-
tional law by itself justifies reversal, or whether traditional 
harmless error standards apply. Though in normal evidentiary con-
texts the appellant must prove prejudice from evidentiary errors, 
where evidence has been obtained through means which violate constitu-
tional strictures the State's duty of demonstrating the harmlessness 
of the error seems to increase substantially. The Supreme Court 
has issued some guidance. In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 
4 L.Ed.2d 242, 80 S.Ct. 274 (1960), it ruled that the use of invol-
untary confessions requires reversal despite competent evidence 
establishing guilt or corroborating the confession. A similar hold-
ing is contained in Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 9 L.Ed.2d 922, 
83 S.Ct. 917 (1963), in reliance upon the application of self incrim-
ination strictures to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The rule regarding the use of evidence obtained through 
illegal seizures was originally set forth in Fahy v. Conneticut, 
375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229 (1963) wherein the court 
stated, at U.S. 86: 
On the facts of this case, it is not now necessary 
for us to decide whether the erroneous admission of 
evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure 
can ever be subject to the normal rules of "harmless 
error11 under the federal standard of what constitutes 
harmless error... We find that the erroneous admission 
of this unconstitutionally obtained evidence at this 
petitioner's trial was prejudicial; therefore, the 
error was not harmless, and the conviction must be 
reversed. We are not concerned here with whether there 
was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could 
have been convicted without the evidence complained 
of. The question is whether there is a reasonable 
possib lity that the.evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction. [Emphasis added]. 
A similar rule was stated in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 
11 L.Ed.2d 856, 84 S.Ct. 889 (1964), wherein the government had Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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seized and introduced into evidence items found in Stonerfs hotel 
room. On grounds unrelated to the harmless error proposition, 
the Court held that the search was invalid and that the evidence 
should have been suppressed. The Court said, in n.8 at U.S. 490: 
The respondent has argued that the case should be 
remanded to let the California District Court of Ap-
peal decide whether the admission of this evidence 
was harmless error. But the conviction depended in 
large part upon the jury's resolution of the question 
of the credibility of witnesses, and that determination 
must almost certainly have been influenced by the in-
criminating nature of the physical evidence illegally 
seized and erroneously admitted. There is thus at 
least ffa reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained might have contributed to the conviction.,f 
[Citing Fahy, supra][Emphasis added]. 
This rule, which substantially does away with traditional 
harmless error considerations where constitutional violations are 
involved, has apparently been enunciated in light of the off-cited 
proposition that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are design-
ed neither to unnecessarily inhibit the police nor to aid criminal 
defendants, but to protect the right of the populace from unwarrant-
ed and unreasonable government invasions of privacy. See, e.g. 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725 
(1960) and Aguilar v. Texas, supra. 
There is at least "a reasonable possibility, "Stoner 
and Fahy, both supra, that the evidence illegally seized and improp-
erly introduced into the trial of this case, over defense objection 
(R.47) contributed to appellant's conviction, The State made 
considerable hay in argument and during the presentation of its 
evidence out of the allegedly nthorough police investigation11 which 
was demonstrated by the introduction of a mass of material seized 
from the cabin. A specific point about thoroughness was made (at 
T.1766-7) in excusing the state's failure to establish the location 
of the sixth round or spent casing which the evidence indicated Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was involved. The state was also more than charitable to its case 
when in closing argument the claim was made that all of the physical 
evidence corroborated the charge that Standrod fired the weapon 
into the victims. The fact is that the physical evidence generally 
contradicts that proposition, but the mass of evidence from the 
cabin puts a nice gloss on the prosecutor's statement. What the 
State really said was: "Well, we have an eye-witness and a half 
to this murder, and their story is consistent with this huge pile 
of evidence. We certainly didn't miss any bet and if there was 
any evidence to the contrary we'd tell you about it. There isn't, 
and the meticulousness of our investigation has convinced us that 
Standrod did it and you should be impressed by the same proposi-
tion." That kind of argument was made solely by reason of the 
massive evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search warrant, 
and could not have been convincingly made but for that. Thus, 
the State fashioned a material "contribution" to the conviction 
of appellant in violation of his constitutional rights. 
The burden of proving that constitutional error was harm-
less "beyond a reasonable doubt" is squarely upon the state. 
Chapmanv. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 
(1967). 
POINT VIII. THE STATE ABUSED IT'S INVESTIGATIVE "MONOPOLY" AND 
THEREFORE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS IN VIOLATION 
OF ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
In the field of criminal investigation the state has 
a monopoly in every meaningful sense of the word in that it can 
focus virtually unlimited manpower, money, specialized equipment, 
and scientific skill on whatever or whomever it choses. The state 
has control of the crime scene and the right to possession of all 
physical evidence. It can largely determine what items of evidence 
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are delivered for scientific analysis and the nature of the tests 
performed. The state generally has first access to material wit-
nesses, and thus it can, deliberately or inadvertently, selectively 
reinforce or discourage emphasis on certain aspects not only of 
the witnesses1 ultimate testimony, but of their very perceptions.' 
In contrast, criminal defendants (especially those who, 
like appellant, are incarcerated during the critical investigatory 
period) have absolutely no role, at least from the critical point 
in time (association of counsel), in the discovery, development, 
preservation or analysis of the physical evidence upon which a 
jury will ultimately rely in exercising its perogative of granting 
freedom or destroying a defendants life. It is clear, then, that 
criminal suspects and defendants must trust law enforcement agencies 
and prosecutors to preserve their very lives. The massive advan-
tages and investigative monopoly inherent in the state are a sub-
stantial basis for the requirements of our law that the state has 
the burden of proving guilt and that guilt must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Those prophylactic requirements are not suf-
ficient if the state violates that trust. Police and prosecutors, 
after all, are responsible to all of the people, even criminal 
defendants,who are not convicts until the jury says so. If the state 
abuses its investigative monopoly then defendants, especially because 
they must place trust in the police and prosecutors, have not been 
rendered all that they are "due" under Article I Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah because the facts presented to the jury are 
incomplete. 
Analysis of what ought to be constitutionally required in 
the investigation of criminal cases is aided by characterizing crim-
inal investigations as being of two kinds. The "who done it" is 
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3 
typical of the case where there is no immediate or apparent suspect 
so that the state is required to conduct a meticulous and "thorough" 
investigation in order to develop all aspects of the evidence. 
On the other hand, in the "he done it" investigation, the type 
conducted in this case, the police think they know who did it and 
the scope of the investigation is reduced to a search for evidence 
which will inculpate the suspect. It is a fundamental psychological 
principle (recognition of which has led to judicially created 
safeguards against suggestive identification line-ups) that we 
see what we are looking for and find what we seek. An alarming 
characteristic of "he done it" investigations is that they proceed 
only to the point where the investigators are satisfied that what 
they have found will suffice to convict their target. Evidence 
tending to exculpate is ignored as being "not significant," and 
reasonable alternative explanations of how and what happened are 
not explored. 
Instead of aggressively doing a thorough investigation de-
signed to find out what really happened, the police and prosecutors 
in this case comfortably basked in the luxury of the "he done it" 
syndrome. Their failure was so egregious as to violate appellant's 
right to due process. This proposition is demonstrated by three sign 
ificant investigatory abuses. 
First, the police simply did a sloppy job of investigating 
the crime scene. The location of the deceaseds' shoes and the 
dead girl's glasses became an issue at trial, as did her blood 
type. In closing argument the state was reduced to wondering if 
the male victim's shoes had been hidden in a garbage can (T.1757) | 
and that "maybe we don't check enough brush. The mattress was a 
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direction in wooded country who knows where it!s going to be; 
(T.1767)." Presumably the same feeble reasoning applied to the 
female victim's shoes and glasses, notwithstanding that the pro-
secutor pointed out in closing argument (T.1766): "This is why 
an investigation has to be so careful and meticulous. The photo-
graphs of the scene and the dictation onto the machine, the careful 
bagging of all of the physical evidence,.. .TT And earlier (T.1765): 
"What I am saying is, we are being picked to death on things that 
doesn't (sic) matter," 
While it is understandable that the investigation was 
sloppy due to the large number of officers from numerous police 
agencies who were tramping around the scene (probably more in the 
capacity of curious onlookers than as investigators), appellant 
submits that the location of those items of evidence was critically 
significant in a manner to be dealt with hereafter. 
The second abuse lies in the fact that the state turned 
its back on implications obvious on the face of certain physical 
evidence and arising from anomalies between the physical evidence 
and certain testimony; the implications were inconsistent with the 
state's theory, and it therefore neglected and failed to secure add-
itional expert opinion and testimony which was not only obviously 
indicated, but was necessary to resolve the conflict. The mattress 
upon which the state claimed the victims were shot and laid for 
several hours before burial is apparently constructed of a porous 
material. Yet, it is also apparent from an examination of the 
mattress, which is in evidence, that the blood which is apparent 
on the mattress did not penetrate beneath the immediate surface. 
The state's pathologist in exhibit P-2, noted that there was no 
significant blood on the female victim's levis, presumably on either 
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the inside or the outside. There was, however, significant m 
blood on the outside of her bodyshirt. The stains on the bodvshirt, H 
gg 
as well as the victim's panties (which were exluded upon an over 
zealous motion of defense counsel),were found at a point which 1 
would have been covered by her levis had the victim been wearing 
them at the time the shirt came into contact with blood. Since • 
no one present at the scene indicated that Miss Beaty was unclad I 
when she was killed, it is very likely that tests disclosing that 
the stains on her underclothing could not have occured when she 1 
was wearing the levis"would have contradicted the testimony of • 
Higgins and Kunzel and led the police to examine other alternatives. ."• 
Defense counsel's failure to explore this proposition no doubt | 
resulted from his own confidence (bolstered by Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)), that if the j 
state possessed exculpatory evidence it would thoroughly investigate 
it and disclose its implications to the defense. Neither was done. • 
Furthermore, the girl's parka (Exhibit F) contained holes consistent I 
with the wounds on her body. The pathologist on Exhibit 2 indicates 
that there was material like the lining of the Parka stuck to the | 
outside of the victim's body around a bullet wound. The obvious , 
inference is that she was wearing the parka when shot. Yet, neither • 
Kunzel nor Higgins (the only man who claims to have seen her shot) I 
mentions it. The parka riddle by itself has little significance, 
but when coupled with the levis riddle raise's a whole series of j 
critical questions which remain un-asked and unanswered. Asking 
and answering these questions was the duty of the state. It failed ' 
in its duty and thereby prejudiced appellant, for it is clear that j 
the jury must have convicted appellant on the testimony of Higgins 
and Kunzel whose testimony was only slightly corroborated by any j 
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of the physical evidence. Appellant owned the murder weapon, but 
everyone else had access to it. Appellant had access to the victims, 
but so did Higgins and Kunzel. They also necessarily had as much 
motive as did appellant, since the state was able to prove none. 
In that context, anything at all which would further indicate that 
they did not see what they claimed to would have served to highlight 
the inconsistencies already present in their testimony and thus 
would have been tremendously beneficial to appellant. Those incon-
sistencies are Higgins equivocation about his identification of 
appellant and his statement that the rounds were fired at a distance 
of two feet from the feet of the victims (supra p, 5) the fact that 
the first time he saw Kunzel after the shooting was "right when 
I stepped out on the porch; he was coming from the west side of 
the cabin.ff Yet Kunzel who claimed to have entered the cabin from 
the rear immediately after the shootings, did not see Higgins 
(although they existed the same door), claimed to have seen Standrod 
ten feet from the victims1 feet, and upon exiting said he saw 
Higgins coming from the lower area behind Roselund. (Supra, P.5.) 
While they both participated in gathering the guns, neither one 
would own up to knowing where the murder weapon had been placed 
and Higgins said that he picked up the shotgun from the same place 
that Kunzel claimed that he did when he used it as an excuse for 
going inside the cabin at the time of the shootings. Since there 
was no physical evidence form which guilt could have been found 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the truthfulness of Kunzel and Higgins 
was of paramount importance. Both of them acknowledged that appel-
lant either agreed or directed that they leave the cabin, giving 
them the opportunity to go straight to the police. Had appellant 
and Candice Earle been the first to report the shootings and claimed 
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that Higgins and/or Kunzel shot the two victims somewhere outside 
of the cabin, the police likely would have believed that story 
since it is actually more supported by the physical evidence, and 
the shoes would have been on the other feet. The fact that the 
blood did not penetrate the mattress would seem to indicate that 
the bodies were not placed on the mattress for a considerable time 
after death. That is consistent with the proposition that the 
girl was killed out in the woods somewhere with her levis off and 
her parka on. The blood on the rock and in the wheelbarrow and 
the missing glasses and shoes (which the state seemed to concede 
were out in the woods someplace) all support the theory that at leas 
one of the victims was killed outside the cabin. 
The critical importance of the truthfulness of Higgins 
and Kunzel coupled with substantial indications in the physical evi-
dence (obvious to any impartial observer) that their stories were 
internally inconsistent and partially false, make it inconceivable 
that the state committed a third abuse of its investigatory monopoly 
and failed to administer lie detector tests"to its two principle 
witnesses. Although the fact that it did not does not appear of 
record, the undersigned represents to this court that a Salt Lake 
County officer involved in the investigation informed the under-
signed that lie detector tests were not administered nbecause we 
didn't need to since their stories were credible." Of course, 
their stories also confirmed the state's theory that "appellant 
did it." "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly 
to offer false evidence... ." A.B.A. Standards, The Prosecution 
Function, Section 5.6 (1971), Appellant does not mean to suggest 
that the state in this case knowingly used false testimony. How-
ever, the other side of the coin is that in order to avoid the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunt r Law L brary, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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unwitting use of false testimony the state must take reasonable 
steps to ascertain that the testimony that it does present is true. 
The situation is akin to one which presented itself in the case 
of United States v. Banks, 383 F.Supp. 389 (W.D.S.D. 1974) which 
produced the following statement, at 394: 
It is fair to say, giving the government the most 
favorable finding possible, that the testimony and 
documentary evidence contradicting Moves Camp was 
more believable than his testimony. The mere fact 
that there was conflicting testimony is not unusual. 
What is disturbing, however, is that the prosecutor 
could have and should have conducted a more thorough 
investigation of"Moves Camp and his tenative testimony 
and he failed to do so. Had a lie detector test 
been administered it is quite likely that Moves Campfs 
questionable credibility would have been discovered. 
[Emphasis added]. 
While lie detector test results are not yet generally admissible 
in our courts, there are few that would still question their 
validity as lie detection or truth verification techniques. Their 
inadmissibility results from judicially created or recognized 
policies unrelated to their liability. Barland, Gordon H., § Raskin, 
David C., Department of Psychology, University of Utah, reprinted 
from: Electrodermal Activity in Psychological Research, Academic 
Press, Inc. (1973); The Validity of the Polygraph Technique, Barland, 
Gordon H., Department of Psychology, University of Utah, remarks 
made as a member of a panel discussion of the validity of the poly-
graph, American Polygraph Association Annual Seminar, Chicago, 
Illinois (1972) , published in N. Ansley (Ed.). Legal Admissibility 
of the Polygraph. 
Appellant contends that in the circumstances of his case 
it was a violation of due process for the state to refrain from 
administering lie detector tests to Higgins and Kunzel whose testi-
mony was effectively the sole evidence the state had against him 
and who had equal motive, opportunity, et cetra« et cetra, and who Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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certainly had as much if not more reason than appellant to fabricate. 
POINT IX. APPELLANT HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
APPEAL. 
Under Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have ... the right to 
appeal in all cases.fT 
Article VIII Section 4 of the our Constitution vests appel-
late jurisdiction over decisions of the district courts in this, 
the Supreme Court of Utah. The constitutional right of appeal is 
the right to have this Court review the proceedings under which ap-
pellant was convicted in light of applicable law. "It is the essen-
tial criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects 
the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create 
th.at cause;" Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
The law applicable to this case is stated in Article I Section 3 
of the Constitution of Utah: 
The state of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. [Emphasis added], 
which does nothing more than state Utah's fealty to Article VI para-
graph 2 of the Federal Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any~tTTing m the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding. • 
About the foregoing general propositions there can be no question. 
Nevertheless, a majority of this Court, in State v. Phillips, No.13816 
in the Supreme Court of Utah (decided September 15, 1975) has stated 
that it does not feel duty bound under the Supremacy Clause, to give 
effect in Utah to the interpretations of the Federal Constitution rend-
ered by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
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The foregoing is said in awareness of the prolifera-
tions that have occurred on the First Ten Amendments, 
and particularly by the use of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to extend and engraft upon the sovereign states, 
limitations intended only for the federal government. 
This has resulted in a constant and seemingly endless 
process of arrogating to the federal government more 
and more of the powers not only not granted to it, 
but expressly forbidden to it, and in disparagement 
of the powers properly belonging to the soverign states 
and the people. This development is a clear vindiction 
of the forebodings of the founding fathers and their 
fears of centralization of power. This was but natural 
because of the conditions out of which our form of 
government came into being and because history is 
strewn with other examples which demonstrate that 
undue, uncontrolled and unwieldy concentrations of 
power in any individual or institution tends to destroy 
itself. It is our opinion that this is the evil which 
the founders feared so keenly and tried so zealously 
to guard against, but which is now rife upon us. 
It is plainly evident that it was their desire and 
purpose to avoid this by providing for what they 
believed to be an essential and desirable balance 
of power between the sovereignties of the states and 
the federal government. 
Thus, the majority of this Court reserved to itself the role of 
defining the meaning of the First Ten Amendments to the Federal 
Constitution and determining the extent to which these protections 
shall be afforded to the citizens of this state. Concurring, Justice 
Ellett stated in Phillips, a belief that the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution was never properly ratified, and that 
the "Due Process Clause" thereof which has been the vehicle by which 
the Supreme Court has wrongfully applied the strictures of the first 
eight Amendments against the states, is invalid. Even if the Four-
teenth Amendment is the law, he continues, the term "due process" 
as it is used therein cannot include the other safeguards contained 
in the Bill of Rights. 
The undersigned would like nothing better than to engage 
in academic debate with Justice Ellett about the logic and historical 
foundations of his opinion,particularly insofar as they are supposedly 
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a brief already too long, there is no place for such historical * 
debate because it is, as a matter of law, irrelevant, even as Justice 1 
Ellett!s opinions on the subject are irrelevant. 
Article III Section 1 of the Constitution of the United 2 
States i 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior -
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain I 
z\nf\ P Q t a K l -i ch • 
and establish 
Hot debate about what "The judicial Power11 is came within fifteen 
years of ratification in the context of judicial review. Mr. Justice 
Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) 
uttered what is still the controlling definition: 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is. Those 
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of nec-





i Stated in a case presenting a conflict between a Constitutional provision and an act of Congress, that statement simply means that 
the Supreme Court is the sole arbiter of the meaning and effect I 
of the Federal Constitution. Whether Marshall's holding conforms 
to the intent of the Framers or is merely an "arrogation" of power 
is no longer at issue, for we have operated for one hundred and 
seventy-two years on the assumption that it is a statement of binding 
law. 
Justice Ellett supports his argument in Phillips by citing 
Hurtado, supra, decided in 1884. In a brilliantly reasoned opinion 
Mr. Justice Matthews, (in addition to laying to rest Justice Ellettfs 
argument that "Law, in its regular course of administration, through 
the Courts of law, is due process of law, and, when it is secured I 
by the law of the state, the requirements of the Fourteentli Amendment 
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not enact state procedure to protect fundamental liberties, the 
Supreme Court would read the Due Process Clause broadly enough 
to compel state compliance with minimum federal safeguards. 
Hurtado, supra, also "held," at 236: 
The principle and true meaning of the phrase [due 
process] have never been more tersely or accurately 
stated than by Mr. Justice Johnson, in Bank v. 
Okely, 4 Wheat., 235-244: 
"Xs to the words from Magna Charta ... after vol-
umes spoken and written with a view to their exposi-
tion, the good sense of mankind has at last settled 
down to this: that they were intended to secure the 
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers 
of government, unrestrained by the established 
principles of private right and distributive justice." 
And the conclusion rightly deduced is, as stated 
by Mr. Cooley, Const.Lim., 356: 
"The principles, then, upon which the process 
is based, are to determine whether it is fdue 
process1 or not, and not any consideration of mere 
form. ...[Rjemedial process may be changed from 
time to time, but only with due regard to the Land-
marks ejstahl i sJied for the p,ro±ecti QiL-_of tha^ citJJIJLns. 
[Emphas is added] ." ~~ ~~~"~ 
The concurring Phillips opinion says that "since the day 
of Lord Coke ... [due process of law] is said by him to denote 
indictment or presentment of good and lawful men." But after 
noting that in 1176 the process of accusation was hedged with 
some safeguards (the grand jury), but that accusation equaled 
conviction because its result was that upon accusation the 
accused was put to "ordeal by water," lost his hand and foot 
at the same time if unsuccessful, and was banished even if he 
succeded, Mr. Justice Matthews wisely observed, at 237: 
[It is] better not to go too far back into antiquity 
for the best securities of our ancient "liberties." 
It is more consonant to the true philosopy of our 
historical legal institutions to say that the spirit 
of personal liberty, and individual right, which 
they embodied, was preserved and developed by aT~ 
progressive growth and were adaptation to new circum-
stances and situations of the forms and processes 
Tound fit to give, from time to time, new expression 
and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Over the next forty years of only half-hearted state effort to 
guarantee nthose fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and policitcal institutions,1' 
Hurtado, supra, Mr. Justice Matthews threat began to materialize 
and the protections of the Bill of Rights began, slowly at first,1 
to be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Incorporation of the right to counsel - Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) - was really the commencement 
of what this court complains of as being an ualmost unbelievable 
arrogation of power by and to the federal government" in the area 
of. criminal due process which continues to this very day. 
We suppose that this process is thought by some to be 
undemocratic. Yet, democratic and constitutional procedures avail-
able to stem it have never been employed. Congress has not, as 
it is empowered to do legislatively, significantly limited the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court anymore that it has 
limited, as it is empowered to do, the jurisdiction of Federal 
District Courts to issue writs of habeas corpus by which the "mis-
chief" of the Supreme Court is emposed upon the states (as a practi-
cal matter). Further, neither Congress nor the several states haAre 
proposed for ratification a constitutional amendment which could 
effectively limit the Federal Supreme Court to what a majority of 
this Court views to be its proper business. Thus, it appears, that 
our democratic processes themselves have ratified what the Supreme 
Court has done and is continuing to do, whether it has the right 
to do it or not. 
What is to be done? The course of action taken by the 
/1T1 TTrl 
majorities in Kazdar ~aird""^ hillips, supra, can only result in disaster 
to our state. At base, those opinions can do nothing but notify 
police and prosecutors that constitutional error is not looked upon 
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with sufficient disfavor by this Court to warrant the sanction of 
reversal. Thus, conduct which runs afoul of federal standards has 
been effectively encouraged and will therefore continue. The result 
is inevitably the issuance of Federal writs of habeas corpus, the 
right to which, cannot under the Federal Constitution, be suspended, 
and which have the effect of wasting the taxpayers' money by undoing 
costly criminal trials, liberating those convicted long after the 
cases are cold and retrial often impossible, and encouraging criminals 
in the pursuit of their business by removing the threat of sure, 
swift, and final retribution. 
Alternatively, this Court can recognize that guilt is 
not a fact, but a process, and forge, upon the basis of our state 
Constitution, a system of criminal jurisprudence so excellant that 
it can in no way serve as the excuse for further federal intervention 
in our affairs. 
As things stand now appellant is effectively denied his 
right to appeal by the present composition of this Court in that 
certain Justices on the Court effectively refuse to apply the Supreme 
Law of the land, i.e., United States Supreme Court pronouncements 
as to what the Federal Constitution means. On an appellate bench 
of five members where four of the Justices often split evenly, a 
controlling vote cast by a Justice who concurs in an opinion appar-
ently for the sole purpose of deleting any reference to the Federal 
Constitution is fatal. Notwithdstanding that there can exist legiti-
mate philosophical and political disagreement about the relative 
roles of the states and central government in our federal union, 
appellant still wishes to remind this Court of the oath its Justices 
swore upon assuming this bench: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, 
obey and defend the Constitution of the United States Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and the Constitution of this State, and that I will 
discharge the duties of my office with fidelity. 
Article IV Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah 
[Emphasis added]. 
Having done so, appellant contends that if this Court is unwilling 
to review his conviction in light of the Supreme Law of the land, 
there is no logical alternative but to order his immediate release. . 
Failure to do so may result in even further Federal intervention 
which, in the context of this issue, would be catastrophic. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no legitimate question that constitutional 
errors were committed during the investigation and trial of this 
case, thus presenting three alternatives. The errors can be ignored 
in the face of overwhelming authority; the errors, considered 
jointly or in light of their cumulative effect, can be ruled "harm-
less" as to their impact on the proceedings by which appellant 
was convicted; or, the errors can be recognized and admitted, and 
the conviction reversed. 
Relying on Sec.77-42-1, Utah Code Annot.(1953) , as amended, 
(which provides that "... error...shall not be presumed to have resulte 
in prejudice. The court must be satisifed that it has that effect 
before it is warranted in reversing the judgment"), this Court has 
not been hesitant to affirm convictions notwithstanding obvious 
"irregularity or error" in the proceedings. A recent example is 
State v. Kazda, Supreme Court of Utah, No.13865 (9/22/75) in which 
the conviction was affirmed on the basis that if there was error 
it was harmless. The majority opinion in Kazda fits into a pattern 
which has become too common in state court criminal opinions. Points 
raised on appeal are disposed of without comment and often without 
mention on the basis that they are "without merit," or errors are 
adiudged "harmless" because the appellant was otherwise obviously 
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guilty. The danger in such reasoning and practice is that prosecu-
tors and police are effectively granted unrestrained licenses to 
exceed what are acknowledged to be the permissible bounds, and 
are then rewarded by having convictions obtained by impermissible 
action affirmed. If errors really are harmless they need not be 
committed. A tightening of the !fharmless error" rule, and appli-
cation of the sanction of reversal, the only available deterrent 
to continued violation, is required if the integrity of Utah criminal 
justice is to be maintained. 
...[Fjastidious regard for the honor of the administra-
tion of justice requires the Court to make certain 
that the doing of justice is so manifest that only 
irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be 
asserted. 
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activists Control 
Board, 351 U.S. 115, 100 L.Ed. 1003, 76 S.Ct. 663 (1955). 
The concurring opinion in Kazda, supra, which applied 
the controlling standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967), is a refreshing leap 
in the direction of that end. That standard, at 386 U.S. 24, is: 
Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally 
admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, 
casts on someone other than the person prejudiced 
by it a burden to show that it was harmless. ... We, 
therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of 
our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before 
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, 
the court must be able to declare a belief that it 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis 
added]. 
Notwithstanding that appellant has been sentenced to 
concurrent terms of life imprisonment, he does not come before 
this Court upon his knees asking that admitted criminal conduct 
be effectively excused because of a gratuitous windfall of legal 
error. His conviction was had upon the unverified testimony of 
two men who extricated themselves from the shadow of prosecution Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for the very offense of which appellant was convicted by inculpating 
him. The physical evidence which, if their stories were true, 
should have confirmed them, is contradictory at best. Appellant 
is therefore before this Court protesting his innocence and seeking 
the review to which he is entitled, protesting, as an innocent man, 
that his convictions are the very wrong sought to be avoided by 
those who wisely created the constitutional protections here vio-
lated. Appellant contends that any one of the points raised herein 
is, by itself, a sufficient ground for this Court to reverse his 
conviction. Their combined effect was devastating. The state 
was the beneficiary of evidence and inferences available to it 
only by reason of violations -some subtle, some obvious and direct, 
but all substantial - of his fundamental rights. The state used 
materials to construct a wall of stones which did not fit together 
without the mortar of constitutional violation. The state cannot 
fairly prove its violations harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reverse his conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MEREDITH, BARBER § DAY 
By: 
JAMES N. BARBER 
By: ; 
RICHARD M. DAY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
KENNETH LEE STANDROD 
455 South Third East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT, fcSff^Vfcfc&Y PRECINCT, 
COUNTY OF KANE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST ) DEPOSITION AND AFFIDAVIT OF 
OF A WARRANT FOR SEARCH OF PREMISES ) NORMAN SWAPP IN SUPPORT OF AND 
AND PERSONS ) PETITION FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF KANE j 
Personally appeared before, me this_ day of October, 1973, 
/v//** & hc>K (5£fr 
the deponent and a f f i a n t here in , toasasr^frt^, a Peace Of f i ce r andLAuiy 
eloofcoidjSla&efefcg-of Kane County, who on oath, makes complaint and deposes 
and says: That he has and there is probable and reasonable cause to be-
l i e v e , and he does bel ieve and there is now on the premises located a t or 
near and described as that cer ta in recreational home owned by Kenneth 
Standrod, Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, Utah, the fol lowing 
described property or things which consist o f items or const i tute evidence 
which tends to show that a felony has been committed, or tends to show 
that a par t i cu la r person has committed the felony o f MURDER. The property 
and things shal l include: 
One or more corpse buried upon said property, l e tha l weapons, 
drugs, chemicals, blood s ta ins , f inger p r i n t s , f o o t p r i n t s , 
shovels or tools used for the purposes of burying bodies, 
blood stained rugs, clothing and equipment. 
Your a f f i a n t says that the facts in support of the issuance o f 
the Search Warrant are: _ _ . / ,> f , / / O f , 
A Sff* 0F -The l/r/}J? /Jf^'jr^Ay tsoTfe / ^ ( 
1 . Your affiant is £5e dxaapfrfrsSga ^Ki^g^^sN^-Shs^f f of 
Kane County, State of Utah, and has acted upon and received the infor-
mation set forth in this affidavit in that eapacity. 
2 . That on or about the 21st day of October, 1973, th is a f f i a n t 
received n o t i f i c a t i o n from a member of the Las Vegas Police Department 
that a witness had reported to them that a murder had been commited in 
Kane County, State of Utah, on or about the 20th day of October, 1973, a t 
the mountain home of Kenneth Standrod, at Navajo Lake Subdivis ion, and 
bodies had been buried upon said premises in shallow graves; tha t there 
was present and par t ic ipa t ing in or witnessing said homocide, Kenneth 
Standrod, Candice Joy Ear le , Layton Roseland, Robert F. Higgins, and Paul 
M. Kunzel. 
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3. upon receiving the tiformation above enumerated, this affiant 
and other police officers of the County of Kane proceeded to Navajo Lake 
Subdivision, Kane County, Utah, and did there locate Kenneth Standrod, Canice 
Joy Earle and Layton Roseland; that said named individuals at the time of 
contact and after being advised of their rights, did voluntarily acknowledge 
that two persons, to-wit: a male Indian known to them as Whitecloude, 
and a female person whose name is now unknown, were killed in the home 
herein described; that their bodies were buried in shallow graves located 
upon property where the home is situated. 
4. That your affiant has affixed his signature under oath to 
this affidavit before the undersigned magistrate at the time and date 
attested by said magistrate; that the elapsed time since facts reflected 
herein have been discovered has been diligently utilized by your affiant 
1n the mechanics of physically preparing these documents; locating and 
consulting with Kane County Attorney, in reference to the preparation 
thereof; locating the appropriate magistrate, and transporting these docu-
ments to the magistrate for his official action in connection therewith. 
5. Your affiant has reasonable cause to believe that grounds 
for the issuance of a Search Warrant exist, based upon the aforementioned 
information facts and circumstances. 
Your affiant prays that a.Search Warrant be issued based upon 
the above facts, for seizure of such property or any part thereof, at 
any time of the day or night, good cause being shown therefor, and that 
the same be brought before the magistrate or retained subject to the 
order of this Court, or of any other Court in which the property or 
things or evidence is triable. 1 , 
e V '^ -;PC' ^ ^ " * "Hiri .tMtt^Wyp-
/ ' ' $£/*/• /SV^X. 
Subscribed and swom-tb before me this > ^ ^ d a y of October, 1973, 
at <3 f <?<? O ' c l o c k / ^ M. 
'jyftite of tlffe Peace 
vfi>? r-O* '.RECORD) ' • " • 
- > - - - - ^ - ' ^ 
- . . • •/• ••/•> _ rfr.-cJ- Court , / 
fi 
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IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT IN AND FOR W^ Vtetgf PRECINCT, 
COUNTY OF KANE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST OF ) 
A WARRANT FOR SEARCH OF PREMISES } SEARCH WARRANT 
AND PERSONS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY SHERIFF, MARSHAL, POLICE OFFICER IN THE 
COUNTY OF KANE OR ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by a f f i d a v i t and deposition jiaving been ih is /day been made 
j Q l C / ? / W UTzfrtfiyA>^ fL / j^C 
before me WRfWHrVffffF, Kano C^un^=^^F¥ffr that there is probable and 
reasonable cause for the issuance of a search warrant as set fo r th i n 
the a f f i d a u t attached hereto and made a part hereof as i f f u l l y set fo r th 
herein; you are hereby commanded to rake immediate search a t anytime o f 
day or n ight , good cause being shown there for , of the premises and property 
described as: 
. That certain mountain home owned or purported to be owned by 
Kenneth Standrod, Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, Utah and the 
land surrounding said home property for the fol lowing personal property 
or things which consist of any items which consti tute evidence, tends to 
show that the felony of homocide has been committed, or tends to show 
that a par t icu la r person has committed said felony or ie lonies which items 
shal l include: 
One or more corpse buried upon said property, l e tha l weapons, 
drugs, chemicals, blood s ta ins , f ingerpr in ts , footpr ints , 
shovels or tools used for the purpese of burying bodies, 
blood stained rugs, clothing and equipment. 
arid i f you . f p d the same or any part thereof , to briqg i t forthwith before 
/La-w^t) 
me at the Lferrg-^s^egr^Precinct, Kane County, Utah, or to any other court 
in which the property or things taken is t r i a b l e , or re ta in such property 
in your custody, subject to the fur ther order of th is Court. 
ISSUED UNDER MY HAND THIS _ ^ 2 r DAY OF OCTOBER, 1973. 
>y 
Jjfe^ice of the Peace 
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IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT, LONG VALLEY PRECINCT, 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST ) 
OF A WARRANT FOR SEARCH OF PREMISES ) RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT 
AND PERSONS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
I hereby c e r t i f y and re tu rn , that by v i r tue of the wi th in Search 
Warrant to me d i rected, I have searched for the goods and chattels there in 
named, at the place therein described, and that I have such goods and 
chattels before the Court, described as fo l lows: 
I , Norman Swapp, the o f f i c e r by whom this Warrant was executed, 
do swear that the abessF inventory contains a t rue and deta i led account 
of a l l the property taken by me on the Warrant. 
ifrman Swapp, Kane County SheiiLfcr ^ - 3 
5^v« 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this <?* day of OcTOoer, 1973. 
Y^rz^w 
Justice of 
•>•• y) f - ' y • ; : : : r : D > 
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